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The afloat installation approval process is a very stringent and rigorous set of 
NAVSEA processes and policies.  In the summer of 2003, an ashore C4I system, the 
Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) Evolutionary Development (OED), was 
installed on board the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19).  This was the first complete installation 
of OED on board a ship and the first time the OED team addressed the requirements of an 
afloat installation.  Therefore, the OED installation aboard LCC-19 provided a unique 
case study of the afloat installation development and approval process. 
This thesis documents the installation of OED on board the USS Blue Ridge 
including the background behind the installation, the challenges and issues faced by the 
installation team, how those challenges and issues were overcome, and lessons learned 
for future installations.  This thesis provides future installers with recommendations to 































A. BACKGROUND  
Command and Control (C2) is a critical piece of any mission conducted by our 
Warfighters.  One very important aspect of C2 is intelligence (I) (Edwards, 1990).  
Intelligence allows the Warfighter to assess the battlefield, courses of action, and 
probable outcomes.  One of the tools the Warfighter uses to help him carry out C2I 
situational awareness is the Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) Evolutionary 
Development (OED) (COMSECONDFLT, 220115Z NOV 03).  Please note version 5.0 
of OED will be the first version of the OED follow-on system, Joint Cross Domain 
Exchange (JCDX.  JCDX employs web services to provide C2I services to United States 
and coalition partners across a wide array of security domains.  OED is a suite of 
applications, graphical tools, and data that allows the Warfighters from different Services 
and other countries to work together to perform C2I functions.  OED is built upon a 
common foundation of services and functions called the Common Operating 
Environment (COE).  The COE was developed to promote interoperability and reuse of 
common components of any C2I system (Rodriguez, 2004).   
Today’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) is a Coalition war 
(COMSECONDFLT/COMTHIRDFLT, 211942Z FEB 03).  The question facing our 
Warfighters is, “How do we share our C2I products with our allies and still protect the 
security and sensitivity of that data?”  Back in the mid-1990’s, a project was started to 
answer that question on a COE-based system.  That project was OED and the engineering 
approach utilized to provide security was Multi-Level Security (MLS). 
MLS technology allows the Warfighter to address the numerous security domains 
inherent in today’s military environment.  These domains range from the common 
security enclaves of TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, and UNCLASSIFIED 
to the more cumbersome domains of Specialized Compartmented Information (SCI), 
Special Category (SPECAT), Special Access Programs (SAP), and those are just US 
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security domains.  Coalition networks and communication lines are now a necessary 
piece of this security puzzle.   
Although the ability to securely and safely share C2I information is the driving 
force behind an MLS-capable C2I system, there are other benefits.  It is not uncommon 
for the Warfighter to have numerous monitors on his desk in order to assess the data 
found in each of these domains.  However, this approach is flawed due to the size, 
weight, and power (SWAP) limitations found aboard a ship and due to the inefficiencies 
and inaccuracies involved in the Warfighter conducting correlation of data in his head 
vice using correlation algorithms to perform that very tedious and convoluted task.  MLS 
technology addresses these issues by tagging all the data with their corresponding 
security labels.  Thus, all the data can now reside in one database so the correlation 
algorithms can process the data thoroughly and the Warfighter can see all the data that he 
is authorized to see based on his clearances, need-to-know, and physical location.  MLS 
is an incredible means to utilize the entire set of data, thus providing value-added to all 
the participants in the database, and still ensure the data is protected so no one can see 
data that they are not authorized to access (Miller, 2003).   
Due to the nature of naval warfare, systems on board ships must meet stringent 
requirements and the installation of afloat systems must follow established processes.  
These processes provide step-by-step guidance in some aspects and broad areas left to 
interpretation in other areas.  These processes are often circumvented or performed 
piecemeal based on each specific installation.  It is very rare the entire process is 
followed in an installation.  Since OED is an ashore system, the first afloat installation of 
OED on board the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) provided a unique opportunity to gather 
lessons learned and apply them to best practices.  This thesis will greatly benefit future 
installations. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to document the lessons learned from the installation 
of the OED on board the USS Blue Ridge.  OED is an ashore MLS C2I computer system 
that is fielded at the Joint Intelligence Centers and Joint Analysis Centers.  The MLS 
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aspect of OED allows the operator to view and add value to data from multiple security 
domains on one workstation.  Since the on board environment of a ship is very 
constrained by SWAP considerations, this technology is very advantageous.  As with any 
afloat installation, there were problems and issues to work out in order to complete the 
installation.  However, the OED installation aboard LCC-19 provided a unique case study 
of the afloat installation process because the USS Blue Ridge installation was the first 
complete afloat installation for OED. This thesis documents these challenges and issues, 
how they were overcome and provides future installers recommendations to improve the 
planning of future afloat installations. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions are addressed: 
1. What is OED and why should it be installed afloat?  
2. What is the installation process and what are the various documents, 
diagrams, lists, plans, etc. required for a robust shipboard system design 
and installation?  
3. What are the approval/authorization/certifications required for an afloat 
installation?  
4. Which organizations are involved in the installation process and what 
roles do they play?  
5. What are the risks and challenges associated with an afloat installation?  
6. What lessons were learned from this afloat installation that can benefit 
future installations? 
D. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
This study develops lessons learned and identifies best practices for afloat 
installations.  Although every afloat installation is unique, the installation policies and 
procedures attempt to provide the installer with a common baseline for every installation.  
The lessons learned and best practices discovered in this installation and documented in 
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this thesis will strengthen the foundation policies and processes and help installers work 
through unique issues that will inevitably arise. 
E. SCOPE 
This thesis explores the installation of OED on board the USS Blue Ridge to 
include an analysis of the installation process; the products of this process; and the 
lessons learned during the installation. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
1. Fully document the genesis of the OED afloat requirement. 
2. Conduct a thorough review of the installation process, the parties 
involved, and the requirements mandated by the process. 
3. Interview the parties involved in the OED installation. 
4. Review the documents, diagrams, charts, etc. utilized in the OED 
installation on board LCC-19. 
5. Review the issues and obstacles encountered during the installation. 
6. Identify lessons learned and best practices for all future installations based 
on the lessons learned from the OED installation aboard LCC-19. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is organized in a fashion to familiarize the reader with the whole 
installation process.  The process starts with a Warfighter requirement and an analysis of 
possible solutions to answer this requirement in Chapter II.  Once the engineering 
solution has been identified, the solution has to be implemented or, in this case, installed 
on board a ship.  The installation of a system on board a ship requires stringent processes 
and procedures to ensure the initial requirement is met without diminishing the existing 
infrastructure, applications, systems, security boundaries, etc.  The installation process 
and how it applies to a new afloat installation is the subject of Chapters III and IV.  
Because of the uniqueness of the OED installation afloat, the lessons learned from this 
installation are very valuable and Chapter V identifies those lessons learned and how to 
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apply them to future installations.  Chapter VI provides a conclusion with 
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II. OED AND INSTALLATION PROCESS REVIEWS 
A. OCEAN SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION SYSTEM (OSIS) 
EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (OED) 
In order to better understand OED and the unique capabilities it provides the 
Warfighter, it is important to explore the critical aspects of OED.  These aspects include 
the history of OED, key definitions regarding the security aspects of the OED system, the 
requirements that drove the acquisition process to install OED afloat, and a quick look at 
the alternatives available to answer those requirements. 
1. History and System Overview 
The problem of timely access to information at multiple security levels has 
challenged the computer security research and engineering community for several 
decades (Brenneman et al, 1997).  Early efforts were focused on the development of high 
assurance security kernels by vendors. The resulting systems permitted controlled sharing 
of sensitive information by users at multiple security levels. These systems often used 
reference validation mechanisms with primitive interfaces that did not meet the users’ 
desire for a highly responsive rich system interface. 
The early 1980’s ushered in the creation of complex applications and the notion 
of multi-level systems. Challenges included allowing users to view multiple security 
levels simultaneously, while minimizing, if not completely avoiding, modifications to 
underlying security kernels used to enforce mandatory security policies. It was 
demonstrated that complex functionality could be provided outside of the reference 
validation mechanism. In most cases these architectures were custom-built “one of” 
systems. This precluded the rapid development and fielding of such solutions. 
However, the rapid growth and pervasiveness of the personal computers (PCs) 
and workstations and the proliferation of productivity tools in tandem has allowed new 
solutions to be introduced easily and cheaply. The use of information technology (IT) is 
no longer a luxury used by science and academia, but the premier tool for DoD and 
industry. DoD is making enormous investments in Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and 
 8 
commodity PC products. This shift to COTS has lead to new requirements: the ability to 
incorporate patches and updates to existing COTS products and the ability to enlarge the 
desktop-based software suite as new products become available (NAVSEA Instruction 
9083.1-COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF (COTS) POLICY, 2002).. Unfortunately, 
multi-level security solutions did not evolve at the same rate as personal computing. The 
problem for DoD systems includes not only the provision of access control and 
movement of data based on fixed sensitivity levels, but the preservation of compatibility 
with COTS, Government off-the-shelf (GOTS), and coalition application software. When 
protecting sensitive information is paramount, then the solution set is comprised of high-
cost applications. In contrast, when compatibility with COTS/GOTS takes precedence, 
then instead of employing high cost trusted systems for timely information sharing; each 
access class is relegated to a separate information system or enclave. These independent 
“system high” enclaves are established by “air-gapping” the respective networks; using 
automated guards; or using replication schemes to achieve isolation. 
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need for the rapid 
sharing of disparate sensitive information. The DoD is now faced with the challenge of 
getting mission-critical and time-sensitive information into the hands of people, DoD or 
non-DoD, which need it in a short period of time so it may be used effectively. 
Historically the information resided in information systems that did not provide access to 
persons outside the immediate community of interest (i.e. releasable FBI) and that 
information was carefully protected and guarded (9/11 Commission, 2004).  
The DoD relies on information systems to support the missions of nearly every 
component organization. In most cases today, information is protected at the highest 
classification level of the data in the system, the system-high level. Unfortunately, the 
information is not readily accessible by persons not cleared to the system-high level, even 
though the information being sought may be of a lower classification level and thereby 
releasable to the requester.  
Operating information systems in this manner often results in the over-
classification of data, over-clearing of personnel, and system redundancies and 
 9 
inefficiencies. This situation commonly exists throughout the DoD. What is needed is a 
means by which the actual security level of the information can be maintained and 
information can be appropriately protected, automatically processed, and efficiently 
distributed. Users also need timely access to the data and the various processing and 
communications resources that they require to accomplish their jobs (Myer & Patterson, 
2003). 
In addition, staff members need to access and fuse data and other resources that 
are available on several disparate systems to perform their duties. Each system usually 
has its own interface (e.g., via a specific set of terminals or workstations), thus requiring 
multiple terminals that take valuable space in command centers, offices, and computer 
rooms. The maintenance of these redundant databases is another unfavorable condition 
that results from using separate systems for each security level. Often a separate database 
must be created and maintained for each security level processed. The use of these 
multiple databases presents several operational problems. First, it fragments information. 
A collection of information regarding a specific event may be split across multiple 
systems of different security levels. Incomplete or misleading information may result 
unless pertinent data can be obtained from all related systems. Second, information of a 
lower classification may be unnecessarily upgraded in the higher-level systems, resulting 
in its over-classification and consequent limited access. As a result, duplication and 
multiple classifications of the same information occur. Third, the maintenance of multiple 
databases is staff and system administrator intensive and depletes valuable system 
resources. Because the data may change continually, updating data bases often results in 
inconsistent views of the current information across different levels. The constantly 
changing nature of the data, combined with human updating, often results in outdated 
information at one or more of the security levels. 
One of the greatest drawbacks of having multiple systems operating at different 
security levels is the inability to share the computer and communication system 
infrastructures, such as cabling, network components, printers, workstations, and hosts. If 
sharing these resources were possible, equipment, operations, and maintenance costs 
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would decrease, and significant gains in overall system reliability could be increased 
(Miller, 2003). 
2. Afloat Derived Requirements 
As evidenced in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
US Warfighter is a member of a strong team of coalition partners all sharing the common 
goal of defeating terrorism and oppression.  One critical aspect of winning this fight is the 
ability to share information across security domains while ensuring sensitive information 
is kept secure.  This capability is termed Cross Domain Solutions (CDS) 
(COMSECONDFLT, 220115Z NOV 03).   One end of the spectrum of CDS is to put all 
information in one domain so everyone has access to all the information at all times.  
This end of the spectrum ensures speedy access to critical information but it also 
eliminates protection for sensitive information such as source of information (i.e., sensor, 
human collection), precision of information (i.e., sensitivity of sensors), timeliness of 
delivery of information, bilateral agreements between allies (i.e., in order for Country A 
to use Country B’s information, Country A agrees not to share Country B’s information 
with Country C), and many other security/sensitivity issues.  The other end of the CDS 
spectrum is to over-classify the data so one can ensure the sensitivity of the data but, in 
the process, eliminate the usefulness of the data by severely limiting access to the data.   
A middle ground must be utilized to provide the Warfighter with the positives of 
both extremes while minimizing the risks of both extremes.  This middle ground has 
resulted in the security domains present in today’s DoD and coalition operations.  The 
utilization of security domains presents three scenarios for information security/sharing:  
system-high, multiple single levels (MSL), and MLS (Myer & Patterson, 2003). 
System-high:  System-high systems do not address the security of individual 
pieces of data.  In this scenario, all data is considered to be at the security level of the 
system.  Therefore, the data is easily accessible to any user authorized at that security 
level but data can also be easily over-classified.  For example, a piece of data classified as 
CONFIDENTIAL introduced into a SECRET system-high system will automatically 
become SECRET data.  System-high systems also provide very limited bilateral 
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agreement compliance, thus again limiting the ability to share data with other coalition 
members. 
MSL:  MSL is a type of security comprised of relatively untrustworthy single 
level systems.  Separation of data and trust is placed in controlled interfaces between the 
less trustworthy components.  These controlled interfaces (e.g., guards and sanitizers) are 
typically smaller automated information systems running a dedicated program, providing 
a dedicated function.  MSL implementations maintain multiple instantiations of servers, 
clients, applications, and databases to serve each security enclave and pass the data up or 
down using guarding and sanitization tools.  Because of this, it is not uncommon to find 
three or more workstations in a single workspace aboard our ships (Myer & Patterson, 
2003).  
MLS:  There are different aspects of MLS that must be addressed to fully 
understand MLS capabilities.  There is external MLS – the ability to take information / 
intelligence from multiple, trusted, security levels and disseminate derived products out 
to multiple, trusted, security levels.   There is internal MLS – the ability to restrict access 
to data on a network depending on the security level of the user.   There is also MLS 
communications - systems that can take message traffic from multiple communications 
paths and transmit messages out via multiple communications paths. 
The afloat requirement presented to the acquisition community by the USS Blue 
Ridge and the Commander, Carrier Group Seven (CCG 7) staff embarked on board was 
directly derived from CCG 7 post-deployment lessons learned analysis following 
operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.  This requirement was further 
delineated in a series of reference messages identified in Table 1. 
FLEET GENERATED REQUIREMENTS  
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
021132Z JAN 04 COMENTSTRKGRU OED MID-CRUISE REPORT 
- ABILITY TO RECEIVE, QUEUE, AND FORWARD RECORD MESSAGE TRAFFIC FROM 
UNCLASSIFIED THROUGH SCI COMPARTMENTS 
o HAS IMPROVED WATCHSTANDERS'AND LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO REVIEW TRAFFIC 
IN ONE PLACE WITHOUT HAVING TO ACCESS MULTIPLE SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL 
QUEUES LEADING TO TIME SAVINGS AND INCREASED EFFICIENCY   
 
- MLS FUNCTIONALITIES FOR MESSAGE PROCESSING/HANDLING, LONG TERM TRACK DATA 
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FLEET GENERATED REQUIREMENTS  
ANALYSIS, ACCESS TO SCI INTELINK AND PRE-LOADED NATIONAL DATABASES, AND SCI 
CHAT  
 
- ABILITY TO WORK WITH BOTH GENSER AND SCI MATERIAL ON ONE WORKSTATION 
   
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
220115Z NOV 03  COMSECONDFLT SUBJ/OSIS EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (OED) 
UPDATE (SERIAL 3): OED /FLEET INTELLIGENCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
- OED PROVIDES AN MLS ENVIRONMENT WHOSE FOUNDATION OFFERS A REALIZABLE 
OPPORTUNITY FOR A CROSS DOMAIN  SOLUTION (CDS) THAT SPANS THE COLLATERAL AND 
SCI ENVIRONMENTS. 
 
- INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION AT THE SCI LEVEL, AND AUTOMATIC, RAPID, RELIABLE 
DISSEMINATION INTO THE COLLATERAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE WARFIGHTER 
 
- WATCHSTANDERS SEARCH ARCHIVED MESSAGES FOR THEMATIC ISSUES AND KEYWORDS. 
THESE SEARCHES OCCUR ACROSS MULTIPLE SECURITY LEVELS, SAVING WATCHSTANDER 
TIME AND ALLOWING MORE TIME FOR ANALYSIS. 
 
- DISSEMINATE DAILY AT/FP SUPPORT MESSAGE TO U.S. AND NATO AUDIENCE TAILORED TO 
C2F/CSFL RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
- AUTO-DISTRIBUTE ALL-SECURITY LEVEL MSG TRAFFIC AND SCI E-MAIL 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
151130Z SEP 03  
 
USS BLUE RIDGE SUBJ/JOINT MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEM (JMHS) 
REPLACEMENT 
- POWERFUL MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEM IS THE OSIS EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT 
(OED) SYSTEM THAT WAS RECENTLY INSTALLED IN SUPPORT OF SCI/GENSER 
INTELLIGENCE MESSAGE HANDLING.  
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
180901Z SEP 03 JAC 
MOLESWORTH 
OED PROGRAM SUPPORT 
 
- REQUESTS CONTINUATION OF OED RDT&E, OMN, OPN SUPPORT DUE TO THE CRITICALITY 
OF OED TO THE JAC’S MISSION. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
211846Z AUG 03 COMLANTFLT / 
N2/N3 
OED SUPPORT TO THE FLEET 
 
- COMLANTFLT REQUIRES CONTINUED CONTACT REPORTING AND REQUESTS JFIC 
CONTINUE TO HOST [OED] AND OPNAV N612, ONI-4 AND PMW-157 CONTINUE TO REOURCE 
THIS CRITICAL SUPPORT TO THE FLEET.” 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
030845Z JUL 03 C7F FLEET BATTLE EXPERIMENT KILO QUICKLOOK 
- JOINT FIRES….A RAPIDLY RECONFIGURABLE AND RELIABLE TECHNOLOGY THAT CAN 
QUICKLY MEET SECURITY APPROVALS MUST BE IN PLACE SO THAT COALITION PARTNERS 
CAN ARRIVE IN AN AOR AND QUICKLY BECOME PARTICIPANTS IN AN EXISTING FIRES 
NETWORK. 
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FLEET GENERATED REQUIREMENTS  
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
281346ZMAR03 CFFC N6 / N2 FLEET REQUIREMENTS FOR A MULTI LEVEL SECURE 
(MLS) SOLUTION 
- IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT OF TIME SENSITIVE AND COALITION OPERATIONS, A MLS 
SYSTEM IS INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION EFFICIENCY AND 
INCREASE SPEED OF INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE AMONG ALLIES AND COALITION 
PARTNERS 
 
- A SINGLE NETWORK EQUIPPED WITH COMMON APPLICATIONS THAT HANDLES AND 
AGGREGATES DATA OF VARIOUS SECURITY LEVELS ACROSS BOTH SCI AND COLLATERAL 
DOMAINS WITHIN AN ACCREDITED MLS ARCHITECTURE / OPERATING SYSTEM. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
281159Z MAR 03 C2F/C3F NUMBERED FLEET TOP TEN INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 
- MULTIPLE LEVEL SECURITY SHOULD PROVIDE THE FULL RANGE OF COLLABORATION 
CAPABILITIES ACROSS NUMEROUS NETWORKS OF DIFFERENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
LEVELS, TO INCLUDE SEAMLESS EXCHANGE OF EMAIL, WEB PRODUCTS, FILE SHARING 
AND CHAT. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
111450Z MAR 03 COMSECONDFLT SCI NETWORK SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 
- TAILORED MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY SUPPORT  TO TACTICAL UNITS 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
262206Z FEB 03 COMENTBATGRU REQUEST FOR OED INSTALLATION 
- REQUEST TO C2F FOR SUPPORT OF OED INSTALLATION ONBOARD USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 







SEA POWER-21 IMPLEMENTATION MESSAGE NR-3; 
OPERATIONAL AGENT REQUIRED WARFIGHTING 
CAPABILITIES LIST (U) 
 
 
- MULTI-NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL  INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, ANALYSIS, AND FUSION SUPPORT TOOLS MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY 
STANDARDIZED COALITION IT CONNECTIVITY” 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
101447ZDEC02 COMSECONDFLT OSIS EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (OED) 
AFLOAT: EVALUATION 
- ENABLE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COALITION OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS 
 
- ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE MULTI-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
 
- ABILITY TO RECEIVE AND MANIPULATE IMAGERY ACROSS SECURITY DOMAINS  
 
- MLS DATABASE TO HAVE HTML DATA-CONTENTS TAGS AS WELL AS SECURITY LABELS  
 
- ABILITY TO INTERFACE WITH COALITION INTELLIGENCE DATABASES  
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FLEET GENERATED REQUIREMENTS  
 
- PRESERVE THE ORIGINAL NATO RELEASABILITY OF THIS INFORMATION AS IT IS FUSED IN 
AN ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
132202ZAUG02 COMTHIRDFLT JCSBG INTELLIGENCE LESSONS LEARNED 
- STRONGLY ENDORSE THE CONTINUALLY IDENTIFIED FLEET REQUIREMENT FOR A MULTI-
LEVEL SECURITY SYSTEM AFLOAT 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
021820ZAUG02 COMCARGRU 7 EQUIPMENT - LACK OF A MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY 
SYSTEM AFLOAT  
IDCLS/L/12373-20899/U// 
ORIG/CCG7/LCDR GREG HUSMANN 
- TIMELY EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN MANY COALITION MEMBERS 
 
- THE REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR A SINGLE WORK STATION EQUIPPED WITH COMMON 
INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS ACROSS THE FULL SPECTRUM OF POTENTIAL SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION LEVELS 
 
- CAPABLE OF PROCESSING AND EXCHANGING DATA AT THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION 
LEVEL USING STANDARD APPLICATIONS:    
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
180235Z DEC 01 COMSECONDFLT SCI GCCS-M LAN UPGRADE REQUIREMENTS 
- AUTOMATED MESSAGE HANDLING / MULTI-SECURITY LEVEL INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT 
o SINGLE, AGGREGATED, MULTI-SECURITY LEVEL DATABASE SUPPORT 
o MULTI-SECURITY LEVEL WEB SERVICES 
o ALL-SECURITY-LEVEL LAND/AIR /MARITIME (MERCHANT/SURFACE/ 
SUBSURFACE) TRACK MANAGER WITH HISTORY AND TREND ANALYSIS 
CAPABILITY 
o A SECURITY LAN INTERFACE BETWEEN U.S. AND NATO/COMMMONWEALTH 
SYSTEMS. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
211442ZMAY 01 CINCLANTFLT 
N6A 
CINCLANTFLT MULTI SECURITY LEVEL-MULTI 
LEVEL SECURITY (MSL-MLS) FOCUS WORKSHOP 
RESULTS 
- MSL-MLS SYSTEMS MUST PROVIDE:  
o REDUCED HULL, MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL (HM&E) SHIPBOARD 
FOOTPRINT 
o ABILITY TO SECURELY EXCHANGE DATA BETWEEN USERS/SYSTEMS THAT 
PROCESS DATA ON DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION LEVELS 
o ABILITY FOR MSL-MLS TO OPERATE IN BANDWIDTH CONSTRAINED 
ENVIRONMENTS 
o ABILITY FOR MSL-MLS TO OPERATE IN DEGRADED ENVIRONMENT 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
272118ZFEB01 COMSECONDFLT  FLEET REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTI LEVEL 
NETWORKS  
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FLEET GENERATED REQUIREMENTS  
- ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND FIELDING OF FULL CONTENT-BASED MLS SOLUTIONS. 
 
Table 1. Navy CDS Requirements (Table 7, Appendix F) 
USS Blue Ridge staff members specifically requested a MLS system that 
provided support for collaboration capabilities across numerous networks of differing 
security classification levels and IP connectivity to bilateral circuits, to include seamless 
exchange of email, web browsing, file sharing and chat services.  The system additionally 
was required to provide for coalition support of a long-term OTH-T Track archive and 
Message archive for Intel analysis (USS Blue Ridge, 151130ZSEP 03).     
 
B. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
An analysis of numerous systems was conducted to determine the best solution set 
for the USS Blue Ridge’s requirements.  Although this analysis is not the subject of this 
thesis, a general discussion of the analysis will introduce systems, terms, and engineering 
concepts and thus provide background for the afloat installation of OED. 
The first step in determining a set of plausible solutions is to analyze the CDS 
spectrum for the correct technologic approach.  As discussed above, the best subset of 
solutions are found in the MLS technology.  System-high solutions result in separate 
security domains that can be bridged by operator action only.  That action is frequently 
performed over an air gap and thus, is not properly audited.  Auditing does not prevent 
security violations from occurring but the audit log does allow for more comprehensive 
troubleshooting and “clean-up” if a security violation occurs. 
One way to introduce auditing and to simplify (even to the point of automating) 
the transfer of data across security domains is the implementation of guards in the 
architecture (Kane, 2002).  This approach was identified above as MSL.  MSL is a very 
favorable solution in some scenarios but there are still issues.  The guards are connecting 
two or more system-high security domains thus introducing all the issues with system-
high architectures discussed above.  The guards themselves must ensure downgraded data 
has been sanitized to the security level of the destination domain.  This often results in 
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data fields being eliminated or manipulated, thus resulting in loss of data, data 
synchronization issues across domains, data correlation issues, and increased data 
management.  There is a cost issue with MSL, too.  The common MSL architecture has 
duplicative architectures in each domain with a guard between domains.  Therefore, it is 
conceivable that an architecture consisting of five servers and five workstations (a total of 
ten “boxes”) could be duplicated for every coalition domain and every United States 
security domain in addition to the guarding devices between each domain.    
The best alternative is an MLS solution.  MLS allows data to be accessed from 
multiple classification levels while being persisted at a specific level of classification 
utilizing labels for each piece of data (Myer & Patterson, 2003).  These labels maintain 
the classifications and releaseability information attributed to that data.  Therefore, 
assuming data is not altered while being accessed, the data remains at its original 
classification level and does not have to pass through a “guarding” function where data 
loss/manipulation may occur.  The use of labels also allows for bilateral agreement 
compliance, releaseability rules compliance, and the ability to utilize data to derive 
correlated products while still maintaining the original classification of the data pieces.  
This is the most important aspect of MLS technology. 
In order to better understand this aspect, one must first look at the three states of 
data that any MLS solution must address.  There is data in transit and that state is 
addressed with MLS communications (the ability to pass data at different security domain 
levels on one network or communications path).  The second state of data is data at rest; 
for example, data in storage.  This state is addressed by an MLS database that allows data 
at different security levels to be stored in one database.  The last state of data is “in 
process.”  Data in process is data undergoing some operation.  It could be an operation as 
simple as property comparison or as critical as correlation and fusion of a large set of 
data.  Today’s Warfighters rely on C2I systems to process the enormous amount of data 
received from sensors in order to gain situational awareness of the battle space around 
them.  It is virtually impossible for Warfighters to carry out the task of correlating 
incoming data in order to maintain a Common Operational Picture (COP) that can be 
 17 
shared around the battle space and up and down the chain of command.  Any CDS 
solution must address the ability to handle the “in process” state of data in order to give 
the Warfighters the products they need to fight the war.  There is only one accredited 
MLS C2I system in DoD and that system is OED.  OED allows the Warfighter to apply 
correlators on the entire set of data available to the Warfighter in spite of what security 
domain he may be working in because OED’s correlators work against an MLS database 
that contains every piece of data received in every security domain.  This eliminates 
disparate COPs in different security domains.  It also prevents incorrect correlation found 
in a system-high architecture because, in that architecture, the correlator working at the 
SECRET level is not aware of TOP SECRET data in this architecture.  The Warfighter is 
relying on a correlation process applied on a subset of the data.  Even when an MSL 
guarding solution is added to the system-high architecture, the data loss found in passing 
data through a guard still prohibits the correlator from utilizing the entire set of data 
available (Newcomb, 2003). 
Although it would appear the key system to a successful Coalition architecture is 
OED afloat, there are other systems and issues to consider.  The following systems were 
selected for the USS Blue Ridge architecture in the analysis of alternatives: 
1. Global Command and Control System – Maritime 
Global Command and Control System – Maritime (GCCS-M) is the Command 
and Control component of the Navy's Command, Control, Communications, Computers 
and Intelligence/Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems (GCCS-M ORD, 
1999). The system supplies information that aids Navy Commanders in a full range of 
tactical decisions. In functional terms, GCCS-M fuses, correlates, filters, and maintains 
raw data and displays image-building information as a tactical picture. Specifically, the 
system displays location of air, sea, and land units anywhere in the world and identifies 
whether those units represent friendly, neutral or enemy forces. It operates in near real-
time and constantly updates unit positions and other situational awareness data. GCCS-M 
also records the data in appropriate databases, and maintains a history of the changes to 
those records.  The user can then use the data individually or in concert with other data to 
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construct relevant tactical pictures, using maps, charts, map overlays, topography, 
oceanographic, meteorological, imagery and all-source intelligence information all 
coordinated into the COP. The picture is referred to as common because once constructed 
it can be shared with joint users who need the information. Supplied with this 
information, Navy and Joint Commanders can review and evaluate the general tactical 
situation, determine and plan actions and operations, direct forces, synchronize tactical 
operations, and integrate force maneuver with firepower. The system operates in a variety 
of environments and supports joint, coalition, and allied forces (Rodriguez, 2004).  A 
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Figure 1.   GCCS-M Architecture (From Rodriguez, 2004) 
 
2. Radiant Mercury 
Radiant Mercury (RM) is a certified and accredited system that provides a large 
array of CDS services to the Warfighter.  RM provides for automated sanitization and 
guarding between security boundaries, downgrading services to allow an operator to 
move data into a lower classification level, format transliteration (automatically change 
message formats, units, etc.), tools to facilitate releaseability to our Coalition partners, 
complete audit records for information assurance and security, and post-event 
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reconstruction tools.  RM is in the Coalition afloat architecture in two roles:  a 
sanitization and guarding tool between the SCI and General Service (GENSER or 
SECRET and below security levels) GCCS-M systems and as a downgrading tool inside 
the OED system (Kane, 2002). 
3. Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) Evolutionary 
Development (OED) 
OED passed operational testing in 1998 and has successfully completed security 
accreditation 48 times since initial fielding.  It is fielded at the Joint Intelligence Centers 
in Hawaii and Norfolk and at the Joint Analysis Center at Molesworth, England.  It is 
also the foundation of the C2I architectures in four allied countries (Newcomb, 2004).  
The system supports command, control and intelligence assessment, including indications 
and warning (I&W) and power projection; maintains dynamic databases to support a 
common air, land, sea and littoral battlefield picture using ground force and maritime 
symbology; provides access to multiple communications networks for inter-force 
compatibility and interoperability that support database sharing and data analysis; and 
supports Joint Task Force commanders, Theater Commanders (COCOMs), service 
components and subordinate units.  OED operates in an MLS DII COE architecture, 
providing local and global networking for on-demand services and timely response to 
consumer requests for fused intelligence.  OED supports joint Air Force, Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard operations with additional tasking to support counter-
terrorism, counter-narcotics and allied coalition operations.  Figure 2 depicts a line 
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 • OED receives multi-source tactical data and intel feeds from AUTODIN, 
OTCIXS, GENSER GCCS-M, & SCI GCCS-M 
• OED provides simultaneous access and network/IP services to Stoneghost & 
Bison networks, including browse and chat 
• OED provides information management tools optimized for dealing with 
multiple security domains and large data rates  
Figure 2.   Generic OED Architecture  (From Fish, 2004) 
 
4. Global Command and Control Systems – Integrated Imagery and  
Intelligence (GCCS-I3) 
Global Command and Control Systems – Integrated Imagery and Intelligence 
(GCCS-I³) provides COP–centric intelligence and imagery-related capabilities developed 
by the four military Services and selected Agencies in response to Joint Warfighter 
requirements. Through the GCCS- I3 integration process, these tools provide Intelligence 
Support to Operations seamlessly within the GCCS family of systems. 
GCCS- I3 enhances the operational commander’s situational awareness by 
providing a standard set of integrated, linked tools and services which give ready access 
to imagery and intelligence directly from the operational display. This capability is used 
to combine the vast resources of the tactical, operational, and national intelligence 
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intelligence and imagery tools. 
Figure 3.   GCCS-I3 v3.6 applications from the various Services (From 
community with critical command and control information.  This results in an 
unprecedented level of streamlined intelligence support to operations. 
GCCS- I3 gives tactical operators and intelligence analysts direct access to the 
nationally produced Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB) for Order of Battle (OOB) 
data, weapons systems’ characteristics and performance information, and national 
imagery. GCCS- I3 also gives those users the capability to integrate locally collected 
tactical imagery and other intelligence with national and theater-produced intelligence. 
This intelligence can be plotted directly on operational/tactical displays alongside 
continuously updating operational and operational-intelligence information, providing 
tactical operators and intelligence analysts vastly improved knowledge of the battle space 
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The Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII 
provides a foundation for building interoperable systems through the use of 
reusable software components (building blocks). The DII COE can be characterized as a 
number of things, depending upon one's point of view. It is an architecture, a collection 
of reusable software elements, a software infrastructure, and a set of guidelines and 
standards. More importantly, however, is that it provides a common platform (or 
foundation) for building interoperable systems. Therefore, one could think of the DII 
COE as a component of system architecture, as it is an implementation of the Joint 
Technical Architecture (JTA). One could also think of the DII COE as an approach to 
software development — how to go about building interoperable systems on a common 
platform. Finally, it is important to realize that the DII COE is not a system, but a set of 
building blocks from which a system can be built. GCCS, Global Combat Support 
System (GCSS), and service unique programs (like the Air Force’s Theater Battle 
Management Command and Control Systems (TBMCS)) are building their systems on 
top of the DII COE foundation (Sardosky, 1997).  
DII COE is a software infrastructure, a colle
ents, a set of Application Program Interfaces (APIs), and a series of specifications 
and standards for developing interoperable systems.  
The DII COE taxonomy defines two layers
ucture services, which include the DII COE kernel services, and the underlying 
COTS operating systems. Infrastructure services address the movement of data through 
the network and include distributed computing and web services. The kernel provides 
low-level services, including a desktop environment, runtime tools, and basic system and 
security administration.  Common support applications provide services that address 
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common command and control functionality, for example, mapping and message 
processing (Sardosky, 1997).  
Standard APIs provide the interfaces between mission applications and reusable 
software components of the DII COE. Mission applications are developed on top of the 
DII COE and provide mission domain specific functionality. 
Since GCCS-M, GCCS- I3, and OED are all DII COE based systems, one 
alternative addressed was the integration of OED and the GCCS- I3 suite of tools that 
could then be utilized by the GCCS-based systems such as GCCS-M.  This alternative is 
very promising because both OED and GCCS- I3 are DII COE systems utilizing the 
Hewlett Packard UNIX (HPUX 10.20) kernel.  Both rely on the MIDB database for 
intelligence data, the Imagery Transformation Services database for imagery, and the 
Track Database Manager/Track Management System (TDBM/TMS) for tracks.  This is 
critical since OED has MLS-enabled both the TDBM and the MIDB.  From a systems 
engineering perspective, another viable alternative would be to integrate GCCS- I3 
applications into the OED system.  Since the GCCS- I3 “system” is truly just a collection 
of applications operating on a common kernel, the integration of these applications upon 
OED’s kernel is relatively simple.  Also, this allows the developer to allow the operator 
to utilize the GCCS- I3 tools in a trusted fashion to add value to the trusted intelligence 
data.  This is critical to optimizing the functionality of the GCCS- I3 tools and thus, 
getting the most out of the trusted data. 
From the Fleet perspective, it is important to review the requirements the Fleet 
has levied on acquisition world.  The Fleet has asked for MLS functionality now (as 
referenced in Table 1) and the only MLS C2I solution available to the Joint Warfighter is 
OED.  The Fleet has also asked for increased capability in the GCCS-I3 toolset (CFFC 
N2/N6, 281346ZMAR03).  The OED and GCCS-I3 integration solution provides the 
Fleet with the MLS capability they desire and the GCCS-I3 value-added functionality 
they desire.  This is a very good approach from the Fleet perspective. 
Another approach is the integration of OED’s MLS technology into GCCS- I3.  
This approach, again, makes sense from a systems engineering perspective.  The original 
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concept behind OED was the implementation of MLS onto a DII COE-based system.  
Plus, this approach would allow the MLS capabilities to be implemented on the current 
DII COE and on the current operating system (Solaris).  However, due to the 
“obsolescence” (Myerriecks, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Chief 
Technology Officer, 2004) of the GCCS architecture and the push to provide enterprise 
services in the next generation C4I system (the Joint Command and Control System 
(JC2)), the web services found in JCDX (OED’s successor and the “CDS cornerstone” 
(M. Cherry, comments at the JCDX Horizontal Fusion Quarterly Status Review, January 
16, 2004) of the future C2I architectures) were deemed a better alternative to re-
engineering the DII COE. 
6. Multi-Level Thin Clients 
  One critical issue of presenting multiple security levels to the Warfighter is the 
number of monitors required to view each level that the Warfighter is authorized to 
access.  This could result in four or five monitors on one desk for one operator to utilize.  
Of course, this presents a space and power issue plus an operational issue of trying to 
correlate all the data manually across the displays.  One solution for space and power 
constraints is a multi-level thin client (MLTC) operator position.  The MLTC fuses 
several secure networks into one slim workstation consisting of a monitor and a thin 
client interface.  By design, the MLTC replaces the multiple monitors and PCs on a 
user’s desk, and lowers hardware maintenance requirements. It also reduces the power 
footprint by not having to plug in multiple PCs and it helps with system administration. 
With the removal of the PCs, everything can be controlled from a server (SPAWAR, 
2002).  
By design, MLTC terminals have no transportable storage capability such as flash 
memory stick, CD-ROM, or even floppy disk devices. By reducing access points, the 
network becomes more secure because users cannot introduce unauthorized media on the 
network. Based upon individual user clearance levels, operators have access to multiple 
and independent networks at once in separate windows on the same monitor, with data 
pulled from widely disparate enclaves.  With the use of “smart” Common Access Cards 
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MLTC architecture is represented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   General MLTC architecture reflecting the use of session servers for 
. Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System 
(CENTRIXS) 
(CACs), users can move between MLTC clients without having to reset their profiles. 
This saves users time as they move from workstation to workstation in support of the 
mission. An additional benefit to the system administrators is the ability to install 
application software on the server vice on multiple PCs.  MLTC clients then access the 
















onic mail (e-mail) with attachments  
ntelligence Picture (CIP)  
 sea, space, and special operations 
xisting communications infrastructures, such as the SIPRNET, 
whenev  p roved Type-1 encryption devices and 
sends a
AOR. The third type is the deployable CENTRIXS network, which provides just the 
CENTRIXS is a global multinational information sharing network fielded to 
TS oriented. Implementation focused on fielding core information services first: 
e-mail with attachments, web-browser-based data access, and file sharing. Other required 
services, including collaboration and near-real time data access, will be enabled as the 
network matures. To the extent possible, CENTRIXS will subsume and consolidate 
existing stove-piped coalition networks as part of a single, unified system (Miller, 2003). 
The basic mission of CENTRIXS is to support intelligence and operations 
information exchange and sharing through reliable communications connectivity, data
lation, and automated processes for bilateral or multi-lateral database access and 
information exchange among cooperating nations and international organizations. 
Specifically, the system provides Combatant Command decision makers, commanders, 
and units with:  
• the COP  
• Electr
• Common I
• Synchronization of the actions of air, land,
forces  
• Web-enabled services, office automation, and bulletin boards  
• Secure Voice  
• Support for US and coalition exercises 
CENTRIXS uses e
er ossible. The system employs NSA-App
n encrypted signal from Area of Responsibility (AOR) locations (strategic or 
tactical) to either a Gateway Forward Point of Presence (FPoP) site or to the command 
headquarters. This is accomplished using four different basic types of network 
configurations. The first type is a bilateral network, in which one nation and the US 
participate in sharing information. The second type is the FPoP, in which an entire server 
suite is installed in the region and acts as a hub or gateway for CENTRIXS users in the 
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essentials necessary to complete the mission: two servers and 12 laptops stored in transit 
cases for mobility. The deployable CENTRIXS can access the CENTRIXS network by 
tunneling through the SIPRNet or another available communications path. The fourth 
type is a command headquarters configuration. The command headquarters suite 
connects to any/all of the other three configurations referenced above and contains a suite 
of servers that provides CENTRIXS services. (JITC, 2004).  The afloat Coalition 
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Figure 5.   CENTRIXS Block I Coalition Architecture (From Miller, 2003) 
 
C. AFLOAT ARCHITECTURE 
After extensive research and analyses, the SPAWAR team determined the best 
approach for a coalition architecture afloat was a combination of OED, GCCS-M, RM,  
MLTC, and CENTRIX (also known as the Coalition Wide Area Network (COWAN) at 
that time).  This combination is depicted in Figures 6 (the CENTRIXS/COWAN 
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architecture with MLTC) and 7 (the OED architecture connected to the COWAN/MLTC 
architecture).  In this architecture, there are two OED systems installed – one on the SCI, 
or “high” side, and one on the GENSER, or “low”, side.  Both OED systems provide 
MLS services to the U.S. Warfighters on the high and low sides via the JWICS 
communications channel on the high side and via the SIPRNET, GCCS-M, MLTC, and 
COWAN/CENTRIXS communication links.  Support to the Coalition Warfighters is also 
available on the high side with BISON and STONEGHOST communications and on the 
low side with COWAN/CENTRIX networks.  The communications involved in the CDS 
architecture are listed in Table 2.  Although this proposed architecture provided the best 
alternative for an afloat architecture by addressing cross domain solutions for data at rest, 
in transit, and in process; the actual architecture installed did not match this proposal.  
That issue will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4’s discussion of the installation 
of the OED TEMPALT.  An understanding of the TEMPALT process is also very 
beneficial to gathering lessons learned from the OED installation on board LCC-19 




Figure 6.   CDS Afloat Architecture, part 1: CENTRIXS/COWAN architecture 
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Figure 7.   Afloat CDS Architecture, part 2:  OED Servers and interfaces (From 
Brenneman & Kwiatkowski, 2003 and Miller, 2003) 
 
Communications Name Definition Comments 




STONEGHOST N/A Used by close Allies for SCI 
intelligence 
OTCIXS Officer in Tactical 
Command Information 
Exchange Subsystem 
Use for GCCS-M Track data 
(i.e., Contact Broadcast) 
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network Older network for message 
traffic, used with Allies 
COWAN A, C, J, K Coalition Operational Wide 
Area Network Allied, 
Coalition, Japan, Korea 
Different COWANs used for 
different bilateral 
agreements 
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol 
Router Network 
US Only, GENSER only 
TRE Tactical Receive Equipment SCI intelligence reporting 
channel 
Table 2. Major Communications channels in CDS Architecture (From Brenneman & 
Kwiatkowski, 2003 and Miller, 2003) 
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III. NAVSEA SHIPBOARD INSTALLATION PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION OF INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS 
This section discusses requirements for Space and Naval Warfare Command 
(SPAWAR) program alterations in conjunction with the Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) Fleet Modernization Program (FMP) for alterations to Navy platforms.  
NAVSEA maintains detailed instructions for accomplishing alterations to ships and 
equipment specified in the Fleet Modernization Program Management and Operations 
Manual (NAVSEA, 2002). 
The FMP Shipboard Installation process (hereafter referred to as the FMP 
process) was established to provide a structure for the orderly identification, approval, 
design, planning/programming, budgeting, and accomplishment of improvements that 
increase the capability or reliability of a ship to perform its assigned mission in 
accordance with OPNAVINST 4720.2G (CNO, 1995). The FMP process addresses 
different installation alternatives to shipboard configurations.  The alternatives available 
to SPAWAR programs include permanent ship alterations, temporary ship alterations, 
hardware field changes or software engineering changes, defined in SPAWARINST 
4720.3C  (SPAWAR, 1998). More detailed discussion for each of these alteration options 
follows in the remainder of this introduction (Nowicki, 2004).  
A permanent Ship Alteration (SHIPALT) is required when the proposed change 
results in any of the following five conditions (NAVSEA, 2002): 
a. Alteration upgrades existing systems or provides additional capability that 
necessitates changes in form, fit, or function to component parts of the ship. 
b. Alteration yields increased power adjustments 
c. Alteration requires additional heating, ventilation, or air conditioning (HVAC) 
d. Alteration requires additional cooling (water cooling) 
e. Alteration results in changes to external cabling 
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If the alteration is deemed temporary, the temporary alteration (TEMPALT) 
process may be used. A TEMPALT is any alteration that provides new or improves 
existing capabilities on a temporary basis supporting Research Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) alterations, or military exercise, or mission requirements.  The 
purpose for these alterations is to demonstrate and test new concepts while evaluating 
effectiveness in an operating environment. TEMPALTS are constrained to a period of 
less than one year, or scheduled for a platform’s single operational deployment 
(NAVSEA, 2002). 
If a permanent alteration change does not fall into the categories (a through e) 
above, then the Field Change (FC) or Engineering Change (EC) alternatives and their 
reduced documentation requirements are appropriate.  The Field Change (FC) process is 
applicable for internal changes (mechanical and/or electrical) to an equipment rack or 
system assembly as long as no external adjustments are required to a ship’s configuration.  
The Engineering Change (EC) process should be used if the product is a software release 
or upgrade (NAVSEA, 2002).  Figure 8 identifies a process flow to determine the 
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Figure 8.   Initial Identification of the Installation Change Process (From 
SPAWAR, 2004) 
The focus for this research is to detail the various stakeholders and activities 
involved in TEMPALT development and NAVSEA approval from a SPAWAR program 
office (SPAWAR PMW) perspective, with assistance from the Design Support Center 
(SPAWAR 04R-3) and the Battle Force Manager (SPAWAR 04F).   The discussion in 
the remainder of this chapter overviews standard practices and timelines associated with 
design, pre-planning, installation, and completion reporting phases for surface ship 
modifications.  Chapter 4 discusses the actual process flow and lessons learned associated 
with TEMPALT approval for an OED SCI MLS ARCHITECTURE on LCC-19 (USS 
BLUE RIDGE). 
 
B. STAKEHOLDER ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Specific roles and responsibilities associated with the primary stakeholders in the 
TEMPALT process are delineated in the FMP manual (NAVSEA 2002), Volume 1, 
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Subsection 9-10.7 (reference Appendix A) for sponsoring activity, SPM and TYCOM 
entities.  A high-level overview of these responsibilities is offered below. 
The SPAWAR sponsoring activity, the SPAWAR PMW along with assistance 
from the SPAWAR Battle Force Manager (SPAWAR 04F) and the SPAWAR Design 
Service Center (SPAWAR 04R-3) has responsibility for the activities associated with the 
planning and development of the items listed below (White, 2004). 
a. Installation scheduling and verification of ship(s) availability 
b. Non-Standard Install Offer Message 
c. TEMPALT Change Control Proposal (TCCP) 
d. Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M). 
e. TEMPALT Justification/Cost Form (TJCF) 
f. Final TEMPALT Data Package (Detailed in Table 3) 
g. Funding for TEMAPLT pre-installation, installation, operational and removal 
phases 
The NAVSEA Ships Program Manager (SPM) is responsible for the review and 
approval for deliverables relative to the TJCF, POA&M, ILS Certification and the 
TEMPALT Data Package.  The applicable Planning Yard supports the SPM in reviewing 
the TEMPALT Data Package installation drawings to assess impacts to the ships 
configuration.   
The Fleet TYPE Commander (TYCOM) has responsibility for final review and 
authorization of the Non-Standard Install Offer Message and the TEMPALT Data 
Package forwarded from the SPM. 
C. TEMPALT PHASES 
A TEMPALT can be decomposed to four phases over its life cycle.  The four 
primary activities are detailed in the remainder of this section for 1) alteration 
development, 2) installation planning, 3) installation completion, and 4) alteration 
removal (Logg, 2004). 
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1. TEMPALT Design Phase Activities 
The design phase for a TEMPALT starts with an emergent requirement to field 
and demonstrate new capabilities in an operational shipboard environment and when 
successful concludes with a TYCOM authorization to begin installation activities.  The 
activities are best illustrated in two phases.  The first phase encompasses activities 
associated with ship selection and notification to the TYCOM for approval to proceed 
with TEMPALT development.  The process flow for alteration authorization is shown in 
Figure 9.  After TYCOM authorization is obtained, the second phase is an iterative 
process for detailed alteration disclosure between SPAWAR representatives and external 
approval entities.  The process flow for the alteration approval is shown in Figure 10. 
To assist with clarity, the activities shown in Figures 9 and 10 references 
SPAWAR processes with blue rectangular process symbols and external reviews with 
yellow diamond shaped process symbols. 
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Figure 9.   TYCOM Authorization for TEMPALT Development 
The SPAWAR Program Manager, Warfare (PMW) program office (hereafter 
referred to as SPAWAR PMW) selects the platform(s) intended to receive the TEMPALT 
and verifies the ship’s availability by working with the appropriate SPAWAR Battle 
Force Manager (BFM), or SPAWAR 04F. If the TEMPALT scheduling impacts Battle 
Force Interoperability (BFI) the SPAWAR BFM prepares documentation demonstrating 
that the alteration will not interfere with the BFI and prepares a submission to the Battle 
Force electronic Change Control Board (eCCB) to obtain Fleet Commander (FLTCOM) 
approval for the alteration (SPAWAR, 2004). 
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reviews that follow. 
  TYCOM Authorization for TEMPALT Installation 
A at W 
comme
After availability is established, the SPAWAR PMW prepares and submits a Non-
Standard Install Offer Message to the TYCOM for approval to proceed with TEMPALT 
development and ship check activities.  The minimum timeline to obtain this approval is 
fourteen weeks prior to installation start to allow adequate time for the documentation 
Figure 10. 













Revise TJCF and POA&M








fter authoriz ion is received from the TYCOM the SPAWAR PM
nces to develop a TEMPALT Change Control Proposal (TCCP) to overview the 
impact to the ship in terms of the proposed alteration modifications and a Plan of Action 
and Milestones (POA&M) to document the proposed installation schedule.  After these 
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 TEMPALT Justification/Cost Form (TJCF) is developed by SPAWAR 04R-3 
from in
kage is carried out directly by the 
SPAW
 Data Package submission is routed externally for review to 
the SPM
:  The SPAWAR PMW has responsibility for funding all activities associated 
with th
W  a minimum of sixteen weeks for 
TEMPALT De
documents are submitted the SPAWAR PMW starts to develop the TEMPALT Data 
Package.  
The
formation provided in the TCCP for impacts to the ship and alteration costs. The 
draft TJCF is reviewed and signed by the SPAWAR PMW and then passed to the SPM 
for review and signoff. The SPM then assigns a TEMPALT Number to the alteration and 
inputs pertinent information from the TJCF into the Navy Data Environment - Navy 
Modernization (NDE-NM) database (Logg, 2004). 
Development of the TEMPALT Data Pac
AR PMW or via tasking to design support agents at SPAWAR Systems Center 
Charleston (SPAWARSYSCEN-CHAS) and/or SPAWAR Systems Center San Diego 
(SPAWARSYSCEN-SD).  The design agents schedule a ship check to support the proper 
development of installation drawings and when the drawings are completed they are 
submitted to the Planning Yard for review comments.  These drawings detail system 
specific space adjustments, cable wiring and interfaces to other systems, and the electrical 
signal flow for each cable. 
A Final TEMPALT
 and Planning Yard and revised as required. The SPM approved TEMPALT Data 
Package is then forwarded to the TYCOM for review and authorization for the 
installation.  Upon receipt of TYCOM authorization, the SPAWAR PMW initiates 
tasking to the Installation Agent (IA) to perform pre-installation and installation 
activities.   
Note
e TEMPALT design, pre-installation, installation, operational and removal phases. 
a. Design Phase Timelines 
SPA AR 04R-3 recommends
sign Phase activities because adequate time is required to orchestrate the 
numerous and iterative activities within SPAWAR and externally to SPM and TYCOM 
organizations for their internal reviews and approval.  Approval is typically granted via 
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meline, Scale in Weeks (From 
. TEMPALT Data Package Requirements 
e SPAWAR PMW and 
includes the f
ed TEMPALT Data 
Packages are detailed in the SPAWAR C4ISR Afloat Installation Design Toolbox 
each organization’s Change Control Board (CCB) process.  The recommended nominal 
timelines for each milestone are detailed below in Figure 11.  The timeline shown is 
slightly revised from the original for omitting reviews specific to AEGIS surface 
combatants that are not applicable to Command Ships, and is revised from SPAWAR 
04R-3’s ship alteration guidance (SPAWAR, 2004). 
Figure 11.   Nominal TEMPALT Activity Ti
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The TEMPALT Data Package is prepared by th
ollowing information that is submitted to the Design Support Center 
(SPAWAR 04R-3) for review, approval and forwarding to the SPM. 
Complete content requirements for SPAWAR develop
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(Nowicki, 2002), for alterations that do not impact ships maneuverability, habitability, 
introduce safety issues, or have topside (antennae) modifications.  A summary of the 
related documentation requirements is listed in Table 3. 
TEMPALT Data Package 
A description of the alteration (Alteration Brief) 
Ship impact data 
Physical Arrangements 
Power Requirements 
System Interface Requirements 
Noise, Shock and Vibration (NSV) Analysis 
Heat Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Requirements 
Signal Security (SIGSEC) 
Test for Electromagnetic Propagation and Evaluation for Secure Transmissions 
(TEMPEST) 
Stress calculations 
Weight and Moment calculations 
Installation Drawings to include: 
Arrangement and Details Drawing (ship/system specific) 
Block Diagram (depicting each cable) (system specific) 
Cable Wiring Drawings (ship specific)  
Integrated Lifecycle Support (ILS) documentation 
Removal Exit Plan 
Ta irements (From Nowicki, 2002) 
 
ALT Pre-Installation Phase Activities 
ble 3. SPAWAR TEMPALT Data Package Requ
2. TEMP
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e SPAWAR PMW to; 1) 
task th
 Installation Phase Activities 
allation Activity (IA) and the 
Installa
ge for the Ship’s Force training 
he RMMCO 
rforming the Ship Operational Verification 
e. Coordinate  installation check-out with the RMMCO 
ository (SPIDER) 
g. d-lined documents for the alteration changes 
tivity steps: 
y technical questions 
The Pre-Installation Phase activity is performed by th
e Installation Activity (IA), 2) procure the installation equipment, and 3) to 
coordinate the installation schedule and impacts to the ship via in-briefs to the 
appropriate TYCOM and Battle Group stakeholders.  The SPAWAR PMW is also 
responsible for delivery of the SPM approved TEMPALT Data Package and ILS 
certification to the designated waterfront activity, Regional Maintenance and 
Modernization Control Office (RMMCO), to obtain permission for ship access and 
support (Nowicki, 2004). 
3. TEMPALT
The Installation phase primarily involves the Inst
tion Management Office (IMO), with managerial oversight from the SPAWAR 
PMW.  The Installation Activity and IMO perform the following activity steps 
(SPAWAR, 2004): 
a. Arran
b. Coordinate installation check-in with t
c. Perform the installation 
d. Verify the installation by pe
Test (SOVT) 
the
f. Update the SPAWAR Integrated Data Environment Rep
database 
Submit re
h. The SPAWAR PMW is responsible for the following ac
i. Produce the SOVT Plan and Procedures 
j. Monitor the installation and respond to an
k. Provide the ILS products 
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l. Report installation completion to the SPAWAR 04R-3 Design Center 
This phase concludes officially when the Commander of the ship sends a Naval 
Message to the TYCOM and SPM that the installation has been completed. 
4. Post-Installation Completion Reporting Phase 
The final phase of the TEMPALT lifecycle is a Completion Reporting phase for 
TEMPALT removal.  This phase has two primary steps for the SPAWAR PMW (Logg, 
2004): 
a. Initiate tasking to remove the TEMPALT and return the ship to the 
original configuration. 
b. Report the removal to the appropriate SPAWAR 04R-3 Class Desk 
Manager and SPAWAR 04F Battle Force Manager. 
This concludes discussion of the phases and activities associated with the formal 
TEMPALT process.  Although it is a very detailed and sometimes tedious, process, it is 
critical to ensuring the installations on board Navy ships do not hinder the Warfighters’ 
ability to carry out their mission.  The days of contractors coming on board a ship and 
loading a system here and another system there are over.  Those practices resulted in 
systems interfering with each others’ functions, redundancy in hardware, and system 
administration nightmares.  This formalized approach attempts to eliminate those issues 
and the process works well in achieving that goal.  However, there are issues that the 
installer must be aware of prior to installing a system afloat and the installation of OED 
on board the LCC-19 provided an outstanding opportunity to explore those issues.  The 
system had never been formally installed on board a ship so the OED installation team 
had never worked through the afloat installation process.  Their effort to learn and follow 
the process provided lessons learned to share with future installers. 
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IV. USS BLUE RIDGE TEMPORARY ALTERATION 
A. ALTERATION INTRODUCTION 
Now that the requirements have been validated and assessed and the engineering 
solution has been reached, the next step in the installation is the documentation of a 
temporary alteration or TEMPALT.  Previously, a thorough engineering review of the 
requirements determined an alteration to the current ship’s architecture to introduce the 
OED CDS capabilities greatly improves the afloat Coalition mission by supporting 
continuous access to four simultaneous enclaves while eliminating network and hardware 
reconfiguration requirements in support of non-US (Coalition) stakeholders.  This chapter 
illuminates the step-by-step process of documenting and approving the TEMPALT to 
support the engineering decisions.  This TEMPALT (named the OED SCI MLS Force 
Level Architecture TEMPALT) provides a significant alteration:  a large number of 
server processors, client workstations and interface equipment in the relatively small and 
constrained SCI spaces. 
B. TEMPALT ARCHITECTURE REQUIREMENTS 
Mr. Steve Brenneman (SPAWARSYSCEN-SD), the OED Chief Engineer, and 
Mr. Eugene Kwiatkowski (AMSEC), Lead Systems Architect for GCCS-M afloat 
variants, collaborated over several email exchanges to develop the unique USS Blue 
Ridge TEMPALT architecture shown in Figure 12 (Brenneman & Kwiatkowski, 2003).   
This afloat architecture is supported by three UNIX servers, four UNIX workstations, 
three PC servers, seven routers, a RAID array, network interfaces to four enclaves and 
various serial data interfaces.   
The proposed architecture’s hardware and interface requirements for system 
devices 1-9 in the below paragraphs (with manufacture and part number in parenthesis) 









1. OED SCI Server No. 1 (HP J6000) 
OED SCI Server No. 1 is the primary server in the architecture and is 
characterized as follows: 
a. OED SCI Server No. 1 interfaced to external storage disks (DS2100) 
and to four distinct intelligence networks at different security domains.  
The server supports track correlation, communications management 
(provides for management of all the communications interfaces), 
databases, message archive, and other functions that the OED 
operators will utilize. 
b. The GENSER serial signals TRE, GENSER GCCS-M, OTCIXS, RCV 
GCCS-M RM are supplied to the GENSER Communications 
Multiplexer which provides the path for message traffic to the OED 
SCI Server No. 1 and to the OED Coalition Server. 
c. GCCS-M serial SIPRNET connectivity is provided by the Radiant 
Mercury (RM) track sanitizer (SUN Ultra 5 Workstation).    
d. The SCI Gale and SCI GCCS-M serial interface with Radiant Mercury 
(RM) allows for sanitized tracks to be processed via a single OED 
Coalition Server to any/all of the Coalition users and to the SCI 
components (JWICS, BISON, and STONEGHOST) via SCI OED 
Server No. 1. 
e. The program office is pursuing the accreditation of serial SIPRNET 
network connectivity while connected to STONEGHOST and JWICS.  
Approval is estimated for February 2005 (Fish, R., personal 
communication, August 19, 2004). 
2. OED SCI Server No. 2 (Back Up Server) 
OED SCI Server No. 2 (Back Up Server) provides redundancy for OED SCI 
Server No. 1 (Primary Server) and is only used for emergency purposes.  During normal 
operations the backup server is turned off as a ready spare.  Network connections, serial 
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interfaces and the external disk storage system are manually relocated to the backup 
server if a failure should occur to the primary server.  The backup unit is then brought on-
line to replace the primary. 
a. Both servers are interfaced to the SCI Network Switch at 100Mbps.  
Three additional external network connections to STONEGHOST, 
BISON and JWICS routers No. 5, 6 and 7 are supported at 100Mbps. 
3. Disk Storage System (DS2100) 
The DS2100 is a rack mounted disk storage system that provides three additional 
73 GB hard drives for data storage and backups.  This system was used instead of a 
typical OED ashore system’s larger RAID device due to shelf space constraints for the 
technically refreshed GCCS-M equipment racks. 
4. OED Coalition Server (HP J6000) 
A future OED Coalition Server will be interfaced to routers No. 1 thru No. 4.  
Those routers then interface to separate Coalition WANs (COWANs) for COWAN A 
(AUSCANUKUS), COWAN C, COWAN J (JMSDF) and COWAN K (Korea) provided 
by an external SPAWAR program (CENTRIXS Block 2) alteration. 
The Coalition Server and the interfaces to the various COWANs were not 
activated on USS Blue Ridge because each interface because of concerns raised by the 
Type Commander; Commander, Pacific Fleet (CPF) (Stevenson, R., personal 
communication, June 30, 2003); that accrediting these interfaces could jeopardize the 
CENTRIXS Block 2 accreditation.  Although it was later determined that the 
accreditation volumes for each system were independent, the network connections from 
CENTRIXS Block 2 were never interfaced with OED (Brenneman, S.,  personal 
communication, July 18, 2003). 
5. SCI PC Servers (Vision V133-1126) 
The PC servers run MetaFrame Proxy and PC client applications. BISON, 
STONEGHOST and JWICS PC servers are shown connected to independent routers No. 
5, 6 and 7 and to the OED SCI Server No. 1 which provides crossover connectivity 
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between the systems OED Coalition units and SCI clients.  PC servers rely on existing 
SCI LAN infrastructure for mail servers, DNS servers, etc.   
The STONEGHOST and JWICS connections are accredited, but the BISON PC 
Server will remain inactivated until it gets accredited (Fish, R.,  personal communication, 
August 19, 2004). 
6. System Management Consoles (SAIC Neptune) 
Two rack-mounted work centers, one per equipment rack, provide for system 
administration for up to eight UNIX and PC servers.  Each work center provides the 
ability to utilize a KVM switch to a single keyboard, trackball and display to multiple 
servers, thus minimizing hardware peripheral duplication. 
7. UNIX Workstations (HP J6000) 
There are four UNIX client workstations that run an ICA client to allow the user 
to display and run PC applications running in different security domains from a single 
workstation along with the local HP UNIX applications.  The workstations provide for 
message parsing, correlation, message archive search functions, and similar services that 
are run on the OED SCI Server.  All of the clients are used for situational awareness 
display, SCI/Special Access Program (SAP, a more restrictive security domain inside the 
SCI security domain) track management, message archive searching, message 
queuing/profiling, intelligence product generation (mostly intelligence messages), and 
other client functions.  All of the clients have an identical OED software load on them 
and are named differently for the type of operator that was using that client. 
The different UNIX workstation positions are referenced as; Collections Client 
Workstation, IWO Client Workstation, AIWO Client Workstation and Targeting Client 
Workstation.   
Each rack-mounted client’s video, keyboard and trackball interfaces are extended 
(via CAT-5 transmitters and receivers to distant desktop locations to provide for a smaller 
desktop footprint.  Therefore, each operator seat is comprised of a keyboard, trackball 
and 18” (NEC 1850X) flat panel display.  The UNIX workstations are interfaced to the 
SCI Network Switch at 100Mbps. 
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8. Radiant Mercury Sanitizer 
Radiant Mercury (RM) provides sanitization for downgrading tracks to the 
multiple OED serial communications interfaces.  The OED implementation of RM is in 
addition to a GCCS-M RM installation that sanitizes tracks and imagery between SCI and 
GENSER communications processors.  The OED RM is configured with a rule set 
specifically for the OED multi-level requirements (Fish, R., personal communication, 
August 30, 2004). 
9. SCI Network Switch (ALCATEL Omni Switch 4024) 
The additional SCI network interfaces were provided by a 24 port workgroup 
switch.  Media converters were installed to allow connectivity to the appropriate routers 
and switches to achieve TEMPEST requirements and security accreditation requirements. 
C. TEMPALT SOLUTION 
This section will discuss the OED system requirements and the associated 
challenges for such a large implementation in a space constrained shipboard environment. 
1. Shipboard Equipment Racks 
The purpose of an equipment rack is to consolidate equipment vertically in 
constrained shipboard spaces while protecting equipment in its payload area from harsh 
naval environments.   The payload area for an equipment rack is characterized in terms of 
available rack units (RUs), where a rack unit measures 1.75” vertically.   
Equipment racks are secured on board ships with a steel foundation mount 
assemblies and bulkhead mount assemblies.  These assemblies incorporate steel rope 
coils to isolate the cabinet and its payload from the effects of vibration and shock, typical 
in naval environments.  The cabinets also include fan assemblies that force cool filtered 
air into the bottom and throughout the payload area and to exhaust heat that is radiated 
from the payload contents.  The filters cleanse the air of harmful particles such as dust, 
sand, lent and dander. 
Equipment racks also provide panels for external interfaces for input power, 
communications data, and the network.  Power anomalies are a fact of life on a Navy 
vessels (even on a nuclear carrier) and electrical equipment are subject to spikes, surges 
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and outages as electrical grids are adjusted.  A Universal Power Supply (UPS) assembly 
interfaces to a 20 AMP service feed to provide protection for all cabinet subassemblies.  
The UPS is in turn interfaced to a Power Distribution Assembly (PDA) that provides 
power distribution to eight circuits and allows for selective shutdown of cabinet’s 
subassemblies. 
The installation of an equipment rack is a major undertaking for a SHIPALT or a 
TEMPALT.  Passageways are not adequate to land bulky cabinets into an equipment 
room or operator space, so an alteration installation team (AIT) will have to orchestrate 
the more complicated tasks associated with opening bulkheads and using hoisting cranes 
to land a rack onto a ship.  Additionally, the installation activity costs increase for the 
supporting shipyard riggers and welders.    
The OED program is a member of the GCCS-M family of systems.  To conserve 
installation costs and time, an SSC-SD ship check team in coordination with the ship’s 
SCI enclave stakeholders, determined that there was an opportunity to technically refresh 
two underutilized 55” GCCS-M equipment racks.  A drawing for the legacy racks is 
shown in Figure 13 (Brenneman & Kwiatkowski, 2003).  Development of the USS Blue 
Ridge OED TEMPALT data package proceeded to document the landing of core OED 




Figure 13.   Legacy GCCS-M Equipment Racks (From Brenneman & 
Kwiatkowski, 2003) 
 
Each GCCS-M equipment rack contained two older technology HP processors 
(circa 1995) that were mounted vertically, consuming the majority of the rack’s payload 
area.  The racks also had dated UPS assemblies, PDAs and suspect fan assemblies.  The 
refreshment plan was to overhaul each rack completely and to refresh the power and fan 
subsystems with smaller and advanced solutions that contribute to increased rack units in 
the payload area.   The large processors, PDAs and older UPS assemblies would therefore 
be removed leaving a bare cabinet assembly on coils to support the TEMPALT upgrades. 
The OED SCI MSL Architecture Force Level suite of equipment consists of the 
two technically refreshed racks depicted in Figure 14 (Brenneman & Kwiatkowski, 
 53 
2003), referenced for the remainder of this chapter as Rack No. 1 on the left side and 
Rack No. 2 on the right. 
   
Figure 14.   TEMPALT Adjusted Racks (From Brenneman & Kwiatkowski, 2003) 
 
The following components were added to Rack No. 1 (in top-down order): 
• 1RU PDA, 8 circuit (SAIC 112-32500) 
• 24 Port Workgroup Switch (OS 4024) 
• Media Converter, 8 port (MILAN 9100X) 
• Sun Rave Radiant Mercury (RM2DIA-AX1105) 
• SCI Server No.1 (HP J6000) 
• SCI Server No.2 (HP J6000) 
• Neptune Workstation Center (SAIC 136-32000) 
• SCSI Expansion Chassis (SAIC 168-32000) 
• Disk Storage System (DS2100) 
• Router (CISCO 2621) 
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• Coalition Server (HP J6000) 
• IWO Client Workstation (HP J6000) 
• 2.4 KVA UPS (Clary UPS1-2.4K-1G-SRNDTI-J3) 
The following components were added to Rack No. 2 (in top-down order): 
• 1RU PDA, 8 circuit (SAIC 112-32500) 
• Router (CISCO 2621), quantity 2 
• Stoneghost PC Server (Vision  V133-1126)  
• Bison PC Server (Vision  V133-1126)  
• JWICS PC Server (Vision  V133-1126)  
• AIWO Client Workstation (HP J6000)  
• Targeting Client Workstation (HP J6000)  
• Neptune Workstation Center (SAIC 136-32000) 
• Router (CISCO 2621), quantity 4 
• Media Converter, 8 port (MILAN 9100X) 
• Collections Client Workstation (HP J6000) 
• 2.4 KVA UPS (Clary UPS1-2.4K-1G-SRNDTI-J3) 
The peripheral components for the data package included the mounting of seven 
PC clients along and four remote operator positions that include an 18” flat panel display, 
keyboard and trackball over CAT-5 extenders from the racked Client Workstations. 
2. Milestones during TEMPALT Development and Installation 
This section highlights milestones or products that were delivered for the design, 
pre-installation, installation and completion phases associated with the OED SCI MLS 
Architecture TEMPALT on USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19). The key activities for each phase 
and the responsible stakeholder for the TEMPALT are listed in Table 3. 
Activity Phase Primary 
Stakeholders 




Identify and Fund the Installation Team Design PMW-157 
Prepare TCCP and POA&M Design SPAWARSYSCEN 
24221 
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Initiate Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) 
Product Development 
Design PMW-157L 
Produce TEMPALT Data Package Design SPAWARSYSCEN 
24221 
Complete TEMAPALT Data Package Review Design SPM, Planning 
Yard, TYCOM 
Pre-Installation Activity Pre-Installation SPAWARSYSCEN, 
Code 24224 






Table 4. OED TEMPALT Process Activities 
The following notes are specific to the OED SCI MLS Architecture TEMPALT 
(White, 2004): 
1. The NAVSEA Ships Program Manager (SPM) was Sherrie Johnson, PMS 
470 (Command Ships).   Shortly after the TEMPALT approval PMS-470 
merged with PMS-400 (Surface Combatants) to become PEO-Ships.   
PEO-Ships is the SPM for all surface ships except for Carriers (PEO-
Carriers) and Submarines (PEO-Submarines). 
2. The applicable TYPE Commander (TYCOM) for USS Blue Ridge (LCC-
19) is COMNAVSURFPAC.  The point of contact for review and 
authorization of the TEMPALT was Many Panis, CNSP N603C.  
3. The SPAWAR 04F Command Ship Battle Force Manager (BFM) during 
the time when the OED TEMPALT was processed was L.T. Clay 
Glasheen.    Note:  L.T. Clay Glasheen has since moved on and has been 
replaced with L.T. Tanya Wallace. 
4. The SPAWAR 04R-3 point of contact is Bob Buckley, Director, 
SPAWAR Design Support Center, Head, C4ISR Implementation Design 
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& Support Division, SPAWAR Fleet Modernization Program Policy 
Coordinator. 
5. The Boston Planning yard representative for LSD, LPD, AGF and LCC 
classes is Kelly Bailey, an On-Site Engineer at SPAWAR headquarters. 
6. The PMW-157 OED Program Manager is Christopher Newcomb. 
7. The logistics lead for Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) certification is 
Timothy Green, PMW-157L. 
8. TEMPALT design and documentation development was lead by John 
Falbo, SPAWAR Systems Center (SPAWARSYSCEN), San Diego, Code 
24221. 
9. The lead performer for the pre-installation and installation activities was 
Mark Gabriels, SPAWAR Systems Center (SPAWARSYSCEN), San 
Diego, Code 24224. 
3. Design Phase Products and Milestones 
This section discusses the design phase products and timelines supporting the 
development through authorization milestones specifically associated with the OED SCI 
MLS Architecture TEMPALT. 
a. TYCOM Authorization - The OED SCI MLS Architecture TEMPALT 
on the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) was considered after close 
coordination between OED program office, COMPACFLT and 
COMSEVENTHFLT (USS Blue Ridge) stakeholders.    The alteration 
was requested by COMSEVENTHFLT via Navy Message (DTG: 
040415ZAPRIL 03) and endorsed by COMPACFLT (DTG: 142341Z 
MAY 03). Note: The USS Blue Ridge was listed in a CNO Ships 
Restricted Availability (SRA) for the period of 29 May through 30 
July, 2003. 
b. TCCP, POAM and TJCF - PMW-157 developed a TEMPALT Change 
Control Proposal (TCCP) that included a Plan of Action and 
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Milestones (POA&M) after receipt of the COMSEVENTHFLT 
alteration request.  This information is later included as supporting 
attachments to the more detailed alteration disclosure known as the 
TEMPALT data package.  The TEMPALT Justification/Cost Form 
(TJCF) was developed by SPAWAR 04R-3 from information provided 
in the TCCP. The draft TJCF was reviewed and signed by SPAWAR 
04R-3 and PMW-157 and then submitted to the SPM for review and 
signoff approximately 14 May, 2003.  The TEMPALT was referenced 
internally to corporate SPAWAR as “TA134”. 
c. Ship Check - SPAWAR PMW-157 considered TEMPALT 
accomplishment to be within the capability of an Alteration 
Installation Team (AIT). The San Diego based team was selected due 
to their familiarity with earlier GENSER and SCI GCCS-M 
installations supporting the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19).  The ship 
check was consolidated with a SCI GCCS-M software upgrade for the 
time period of 03/01/03 through 03/05/03. 
d. TEMPALT Data Package – The OED SCI MLS Architecture 
TEMPALT Data Package and supporting attachments for alteration 
drawings and ILS certification was submitted to the SPM and PY on 
05 June, 2003 (Reference Appendix B).  These attachments are 
included as additional appendices in this document for review 
purposes. 
i. TEMPALT Arrangement Drawing (Reference Appendix C) 
ii. TEMPALT Cable Block Diagram (Reference Appendix D) 
iii. TEMPALT ILS Certification (Reference Appendix E) 
e. ILS Products – ILS certification submission to the SPM was provided 
on 10 June, 2003. 
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f. The SPM assigns a NAVSEA TEMPALT number and inputs the 
information into the Navy Data Environment - Navy Modernization 
(NDE-NM) database and the OED SCI MLS Architecture TEMPALT 
is referenced in the database as TA1517 on 11 June, 2003. 
g. TYCOM (COMNAVSURFPAC) authorization of TEMPALT Data 
Package (Reference: DTG 111812ZJUN03) 
4. Pre-Installation Phase products and Milestones 
The Pre-Installation Phase activity provides the coordination and preparation for 
the alteration installation.  This activity consists of the following steps to be performed by 
SPAWAR PMW-157: 
a. Complete procurement activities and prepare shipments to support the 
alteration requirements prior to the estimated start date of 09 June, 
2003. 
b. Coordinate the alteration with the SPM, TYCOM, Fleet Stakeholders 
with in-briefs scheduled for 30 June, 2003.  Normally this would be 
done ahead of the install window, but since this alteration was in Japan 
the in-brief was accomplished the first day of the three week 
installation window (30 June through 21 July, 2003). 
c. Obtain SPM approved copies of the TEMPALT Data Package with 
ILS certification for RMMCO check-in on 30 June, 2003. 
5. Installation Phase Products and Milestones 
The Installation Activity involves primarily the Installation Activity and the 
Installation Management Office (IMO), with monitoring and tasking support from 
SPAWAR PMW-157.  
a. The Installation Activity and IMO perform the following activity 
steps: 
b. Coordinate installation check-in with RMMCO on 01 July, 2003. 
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c. Perform installation and on-the-job training from 02 July through 20 
July, 2003. 
d. Verify the new system installation by completing the Ship Operational 
Verification Test (SOVT) on 20 July, 2003. 
e. Coordinate the installation check-out with RMMCO on 20 July, 2003.  
f. Update the SPAWAR Integrated Data Environment Repository 
(SPIDER) database (approximately 21 July, 2003). 
g. Submit red-lined drawings to the Planning Yard for the alteration 
changes on 28 July, 2003. 
SPAWAR PMW-157, the sponsoring activity, was responsible for the following 
activity steps: 
a. Produce the SOVT Plan and Procedures prior to installation start. 
b. Monitor the installation and respond to any technical questions. 
c. Report Installation completion to the SPAWAR 04R-3 Design Center.  
Note:  The Commander of the Ship will send a Naval Message to the 
TYCOM and SPM that the Installation has been completed. 
6. Completion Reporting Phase Products and Milestones 
A post completion decision to retain or remove the TEMPALT needs to be 
addressed before the alteration turns a year old, reference Figure 15.  The TYCOM can 
consider options to:  
a. Restore the ship to its original configuration 
b. Extend the TEMPALT for specific term (typically a year) 
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Figure 15.   Remove/Extend/Convert TEMPALT 
The present status of the OED SCI MLS Architecture TEMPALT on USS Blue 
Ridge is that it remains on board, while the ship is in the ship yard undergoing repairs, 
even though it should have been removed in July, 2004 per the removal plan.  The OED 
program office is currently in collaboration with NETWARCOM requesting funding to 
support a second year’s extension. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter overviewed the OED system requirements in terms of signal flow 
and the associated hardware components interfacing to multiple network domains and 
external systems.  Space for equipment is very limited in ship spaces, and the TEMPALT 
authors coordinated with the fleet stakeholders to accommodate all the server and 
network components as a technical refreshment of two 55” legacy SPAWAR PMW-157 
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program equipment racks.  Operator positions were also technically refreshed with 
rugged UNIX and PC workstations with flat panel displays. 
Many lessons were learned by OED representatives during the process detailed 
above.  These observations will be summarized in Chapter 5 with a checklist to aid the 
installation teams of the future.  In addition to Chapter 5’s valuable information, the 
documentation developed by the OED program office with the assistance from the 
Installation Group (SPAWAR 04R-3) during this process have been included in the 
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V. LESSONS LEARNED 
A. SHIPBOARD INSTALLATION OF COTS EQUIPMENT 
The previous three chapters provided a narrative of the afloat installation process 
by describing the requirements process, the engineering analysis and solution for the 
requirements, and the installation policies and procedures required to field the 
engineering solution afloat.  The earlier chapters not only described the process but 
provided in-depth insight into an afloat installation by identifying lessons learned and 
best practices found by the OED installation team.  These best practices and lessons 
learned will be the focus of this chapter. 
 The Navy has introduced efficiency and cost savings with the use of COTS 
equipment afloat.  However, there are critical considerations to take into account when 
using COTS as the OED installation team discovered.  The shipboard implementation of 
each COTS component required that the OED program office procure specially designed 
kits for the UNIX and PC servers to technically refresh the legacy GCCS-M equipment 
racks.  The kits included a hinged face plate, heavy duty slide rails and a cable harnesses 
tie wrapped to a swing arm that provided support for each processor’s power and 
communications requirements.  Additional rack assemblies included rack mounted KVM 
displays, UPS assemblies, fan assemblies, power distribution assemblies and a prototype 
mounting shelf for the numerous routers and related rear I/O panel network interface 
requirements. 
Client positions provide analysis tools and decision aid support and are designed 
similarly to survive the harsh naval environmental forces for shock and vibration.  These 
workstations were either kitted up and collocated with the servers in the equipment racks 
or secured locally to an operator’s desk.  Each flat panel display was enveloped in metal 
in a metal frame which was secured to the operator’s desktop with bolts. 
B. SPAWAR PROGRAM TEMPALT CHECKLIST 
This research provides a checklist to assist other SPAWAR program offices in 
understanding the numerous TEMPALT products and the milestones accomplished for 
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the design, pre-installation, installation and post-installation phases.  A SPAWAR 
program TEMPALT checklist is provided in Table 4. 
SPAWAR PROGRAM TEMPALT CHECKLIST 
1.A. Initiate Planning and Coordination: 
Ensure command support and concurrence with installation plan 
Prepare TCCP and draft POA&M 
Submit TCCP and POA&M to SPAWAR 04R-3 
SPAWAR 04R-3 Assigns TEMPALT# and creates entry into SPIDER 
 
1.B. Obtain Authorization: 
Select Ship(s) and Verify CNO Availability 
Submit Non-Standard Install Offer Message to TYCOM.  Submit to CINC for installs affecting BG 
Interoperability. 
Receive TYCOM and/or FLTCOOM authorization to perform installation 
Identify and receive funding necessary for installation 
Identify critical Points-of-Contact and introduce them to the effort 
Shipyard, SPAWAR on-site personnel, RMMCO, etc. 
 
1.C Develop Temporary Justification Cost Form and ILS Documentation: 
Prepare Temporary Justification Cost Form (TJCF) with SPAWAR 04R-3 
Initiate Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Product Development 
SPAWAR 04R-3 submits TJCF to NAVSEA Ships Program Manager (SPM) 
Receive SPM review and approval for TJCF 
 
2.0 Ship Check: 
Request authorization to perform ship check from cognizant TYCOM  
Receive authorization to perform ship check from cognizant TYCOM 
Identify and fund the Installation Team 
Perform ship in-brief and ship check 
Develop ship specific drawings supporting the TEMPALT Data Package for electrical, mechanical and 
interface data 
 
3.0 TEMPALT Data Package 
3.A TEMPALT Data Package Development: 
Description of the Alteration (Alteration Brief) 
Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) 
Ship Impact Data 
Physical Arrangements 
Power Requirements 
System Interface Requirements 
Noise, Shock and Vibration (NSV) Analysis 
Heat Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Requirements 
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Signal Security (SIGSEC) 
Test for Electromagnetic Propagation and Evaluation for Secure Transmissions (TEMPEST) 
Stress Calculations 
Calculated Weight and Moments Record 
Ship-specific TEMPALT Installation Drawings 
Arrangement Drawings 
Cable Block Diagram 
Cable Wiring Drawings or Cable Running Sheets 
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Certification 
Removal/Exit plan established with funding identified 
Identify accreditation boundaries and  
Determine accreditation requirements for those boundaries 
3.B TEMPALT Data Package Approval 
Submit TEMPALT Data Package for SPM Review 
Receive SPM approval 
SPM submits the TEMPALT Data Package for TYCOM authorization 
Receive TYCOM authorization 
Submit TEMPALT Data Package and ILS Certification to the designated waterfront activity or Regional 
Maintenance and Modernization Control Office (RMMCO) as appropriate. 
Receive RMMCO approval to proceed with alteration 
 
4.0 Pre-Ship Installation Process 
Coordinate the TEMPALT pre-installation RMMCO as appropriate 
Procure all installation equipment 
Run initial lab tests on equipment upon receipt 
Pre-stage all equipment, run equipment tests again. 
Task and assign the Installation Activity 
Lead ship in brief 
 
5.0 Installation Process 
Start and complete the TEMPALT installation requirements 
Provide training support 
Perform certification testing to ensure completion 
Deliver ILS products 
Report installation completion to SPAWAR 04R-3 
Installation Completion Navy Message to TYCOM/FLTCINC 
 
6.0 Post Ship Install Process 
Carry out the removal exit plan to return the ship to its original configuration 
Completion Reporting to SPAWAR 04R-3, SPAWAR 04F, TYCOM and FLTCINC 




C. RECOMMENDED VERSUS ACTUAL TIMELINES FOR TEMPALT 
ACTIVITIES AND MILESTONES 
The TEMPALT process is performed in the context of the NAVSEA Fleet 
Readiness Program (FRP) timeline (reference Figure 11).  The FRP timeline establishes 
the need dates for the design artifacts required to support an installation.  Figure 10 shows 
the first product (the TCCP and POA&M) must be delivered to SPAWAR 04R-3 twelve 
weeks prior to the installation date.   Table 5 tabulates the information from the nominal 
timeline and matrixes TEMPALT products (gray rows) and activities (white rows) in 
activity or milestone order.  The timeline column is scaled in weeks prior to the 
installation start date. 
The purpose of this section is to compare recommended delivery dates for 
standard TEMPALT products and activities to the actual products and activities 
associated with the OED SCI MLS Architecture TEMPALT (TA1517).  The column 
labeled Nominal Date is a converted calendar date from the installation target date of 09 
June, 2003. 
TEMPALT 







Select Ship, Liaison with TYCOM via 04F I-16 03 March  04 April 
Submit Non-Standard Install Offer Message I-14 17 March  14 May 
TCCP and POA&M Submitted to 04-R3 I-12 31 March 08 May 
TJCF Submitted to SPM I-12 31 March  14 May 
Ship Check start I-10 14 April  03 March 
TEMPALT Data Package Start I-10 14 April  15 May 
TEMPALT Data Package Submitted to 04-R3 I-8 28 April  02 June 
Ship Check completed I-8 28 April  07 March 
TEMPALT Data Package Submitted to SPM I-4 12 May  05 June 
ILS Certification Submitted to SPM I-2 26 May  10 June 
SPM Approval I 09 June 11 June 
TYCOM Authorization I 09 June  11 June 
RMMCO Approval of TEMPALT Package I  30 June 
Installation Start I  30 June 
Table 6. OED TEMPALT Timelines for Activities and Products 
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Two general observations can be made from Table 5.  First, the OED program 
office representatives initiated activities and the development of products approximately 
four to two weeks behind the recommended schedule.  A compressed development and 
delivery schedule was accomplished with close teaming and coordination with both 
Battle Force Manager (SPAWAR 04F) and the Design Support Center (SPAWAR 04R-
3) representatives.  The POA&M installation target of 09 June was missed by three 
weeks because of additional activities required for RMMCO check-in and approval of the 
TEMPALT Data Package.   This ultimately verifies the nominal schedule, where starting 
two to four weeks late and close attention of OED support members yielded a three week 
late installation start. 
A secondary observation is for external reviewers and their processes.  SPAWAR 
04R-3 representatives work closely with external SPM and TYCOM recommendations 
and could request expedited review of the various deliverables.  What caught most 
everyone by surprise was the addition process time afforded for obtaining the TYCOM 
approved TEMPALT Data Package and ILS Certification and checking these products in 
with RMMCO.  RMMCO is the “gate keeper” at the waterfront, and you can’t start 
installation activities without their concurrence.  The primary lesson learned is the 
RMMCO check-in and approval process can take several weeks. 
D. FLEET INPUTS 
The one factor that kept this process going throughout the TEMPALT timeline 
listed in Table 5 was the Fleet’s inputs.  If the USS Blue Ridge or the Seventh Fleet staffs 
had not forcefully demanded the installation of OED on board LCC-19, the installation 
would have been delayed to the next availability (four to five months later) or cancelled 
entirely.  The OED Program Office collected the Warfighters’ concerns and requirements 
and used these to keep the process going when it seemed to be stopped.  As evidenced in 
our actual versus recommended timeline numbers, the OED installation team was able to 
push thru documentation at a rate much faster than the recommended timeframe.  The 
ability to compress the time requirements was fueled entirely by the Fleet’s insistence 
that OED get installed in that availability. 
E. ACTUAL VERSUS PLANNED SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
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Although the original architecture was developed and proposed by a team of CDS 
and systems experts (the SPAWAR CDS IPT), the process of evolving from the best 
engineering solution to the Warfighters’ requirements to the installed solution set is a 
tortuous road.  The installation team must be ready to address sudden implementation 
changes (which is ironic when the actual process is very rigid) due numerous issues. 
1. Chain of Command Issues 
The proposed architecture relied heavily on OED to be the cornerstone of the 
Coalition architecture.  The SPAWAR CDS IPT recognized the need to address all three 
states of data (at rest/storage, in transit, and in process) in the Coalition architecture in 
order to provide the Warfighter with the best solution to his Coalition requirements.  For 
example, MLTC is a very good tool for eliminating multiple monitors/PCs on the 
Warfighter’s desk but the Warfighter is forced to correlate the four or five windows on 
his MLTC monitor if the data provided is of any use to him.  MLTC with an OED now 
provides a means to view different security domains with the correlation process 
occurring in the background on the OED server.  Another example is CENTRIXS.  
Coalition networks are a very good means of transiting data between Coalition partners 
and US Warfighters.  However, the network ends in a server with no means to transfer 
data between the networks and no value added by bringing in track data from other 
sources since the data can’t be correlated with the larger set of data for that track.  With 
CENTRIXS and OED, the data can be labeled with its origin (thus honoring bilateral 
agreements), utilized by the correlators to get the best picture (OED performs correlation 
on the entire set of data from SCI to Coalition while protecting the security levels of all 
the data), and the best COP can then be disseminated to everyone in the battle space with 
the correct associated data according to their clearances and bilateral agreements.  
However, due to personalities, risk aversion, and other issues, the proposed 
architecture was not carried out in the installation of OED.  Many of the communications 
channels were not interfaced and the GENSER Coalition OED was never implemented.  
It is critical that the Program Office ensure chain of command approval and backing prior 
to starting the installation process.  Again, the Fleet’s support in this matter will benefit 
the program’s cause. 
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2. Security Accreditation Issues 
Accreditation issues are always, always going to be critical to a successful 
installation.  The OED program has been accredited over 48 times so the general feeling 
of the installation team was accreditation was the easy piece of the problem.  
Unfortunately, accreditation is never easy and the OED Program Office should have 
brought the accreditors into the process early.  The actual OED system accreditation was 
rather straightforward (as expected).  The accreditation issues arose when the accreditors 
looked at the OED interfaces with other programs.  Although OED interfaces with many 
different networks, communication lines, and systems in its ashore installation, many 
personnel involved in the installation process for the entire Coalition architecture decided 
the risk of accrediting OED interfaces with GCCS-M (two-way) and CENTRIXS/MLTC 
architecture was too great.  As it turned out, OED is accredited at all of its shore sites to 
interface with GCCS (either GCCS-M or the Joint GCCS).  The other issue was the risk 
of CENTRIXS/MLTC accreditation failing due to the OED/CENTRIX accreditation if 
that should fail.  After discussing the issue with all the accreditors involved, it was agreed 
that the accreditation boundaries for OED and CENTRIX/MLTC made their 
accreditations entirely independent of each other so if the interface accreditation failed, 
neither system’s accreditation would be effected (Thomas, G., personal communication, 
June 30, 2003).  However, the complete accreditation was never pursued. 
3. Funding 
Funding is always an issue that must be addressed early on and often throughout 
the process.  The OED installation was so strongly supported by the Fleet up and down 
the chain of command that the installation was started without the funding in hand at the 
Program Office.  Although it was in the “do what’s best for the Fleet” spirit of the 
Program Office, the funding never came through and the program suffers to this day from 
that.  Always ensure the funding is in place and the correct amount of funding in each 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The afloat installation process is a very complex and lengthy process to follow but 
a very necessary process nonetheless.  It is necessary due to the mission criticality of the 
IT equipment and software on board a US Naval warship.  The days of fighting with iron 
canon balls and targeting by “eyeing it” are long gone and the slightest perturbation in the 
Warfighter’s  information systems architecture could affect the command and control 
mission, the targeting mission, the strike mission, and the force protection (self-defense) 
mission, to name a few.  It is far too risky to simply install hardware and software on 
board a ship without rigid processes and tried practices. 
The OED installation afloat provided a “clean slate” to learn the up’s and down’s 
of a rigid installation process.  The team was new to afloat installations, the system had 
never been fully installed on board a ship, and the program office, along with other 
SPAWAR partners, worked through many issues and obstacles to achieve a successful 
installation.  Is this the last installation afloat for any SPAWAR system?  Definitely not, 
so the authors of this paper were determined to share the lessons learned of this 
experience so future installations can go more smoothly.  It is better to benefit from 
lessons learned than to bog down on lessons re-learned the hard way. 
The critical components of a successful installation are time, budget, and 
command support.  With sufficient time, funding and support, any installation can be 
accomplished.  In the OED installation, time was an issue because the installation started 
much later than it should have.  Funding was an issue, not so much during the installation 
process but, more so, now during the life cycle maintenance of the system (which is part 
of the installation process, as is the disposal/removal step).  Since OED is a woefully 
under funded program, funding problems arose during the installation, too, but those 
were not due to the installation process per se.  Lastly, command support issues arose 
throughout the installation process.  Most of those were addressed by the strong teaming 
of the OED installation team, the program office, the SPAWAR installation experts 
(Code 04), and the on-site SPAWAR detachment personnel.  Of course, a lot of credit 
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goes to the Fleet personnel involved because the pressure they applied to resolving the 
issues definitely helped the team work them out in a timely fashion.  However, some 
command support issues did not get worked out and the proposed OED installation came 
up short of everyone’s expectations in regards to communications channels and 
SCI/GENSER services.  Some of these shortfalls were based on concerns for the 
Warfighter’s ability to utilize the systems and tools already on board and the risk (real or 
perceived) of setting up certain interfaces to those existing systems and tools.   
Overall, the OED installation was a success and, via interviews with the team, 
researching the installation effort, and personal experience, the authors were able to 
dissect that success to document lessons learned and a comprehensive checklist for future 
installers to follow, modify, and add new lessons learned.  As the installation policies and 
procedures provide the basic foundation for every installation, the comprehensive 
checklist provides the future installer with a tool to avoid pitfalls, identify issues, and 
successfully complete an installation in a timely manner.  Of course, every installation is 
unique and this thesis provides the future installer with the insight and forethought to 
meet those unique concerns and problems early and resolve them correctly.  It is the 
mission of every PEO and SPAWAR employee to provide the Warfighters with the tools 
they need to successfully carry out their missions.  Every effort should be made to 
efficiently carry out the PEO/SPAWAR mission and this thesis, with its lessons learned, 
best practices, and comprehensive installation checklist, is a step forwards in improving 
the installation process. 
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APPENDIX A: NAVSEA FLEET MODERNIZATION PROCESS, 
VOL 1, SECTION 9, SUBSECTION 9-10 TEMPORARY 
ALTERATIONS (TEMPALTS) 
9-10. 1 Scope 
This subsection outlines the policy, process and responsibilities for development and 
approval of TEMPALTs proposed for accomplishment on operational Fleet ships. 
 
9-10.2 Exemptions 
This subsection does not apply to the following: 
• Submarines - TEMPALTs proposed for accomplishment on submarines or submersibles are 
covered by reference S9(z). 
• Availability Testing - TEMPALTs performed as part of dry-dock or dockside testing during 
overhauls and other availabilities. 
• Test Gauges - Temporary installation of mechanical gauges that connect to fittings designed 
and installed for test equipment attachment.  The use of test gauge fittings for other than test 
equipment attachment will be approved by the SPM before usage. 
• Temporary Equipment Alterations in the form of ORDALTs, MACHALTs, FCs AND ECs. 
 
9-10.3 Definition 
A TEMPALT is any alteration that provides new or improves existing capabilities on a 
temporary basis (not to exceed one year or one operational deployment in duration) in 
support of Research Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) or military exercise or 
mission requirements.  Budgeting and funding for TEMPALT accomplishment is usually 
part of the applicable project or program for RDT&E alterations, or the cognizant 
FLTCINC, TYCOM or CNO Resource Sponsor for mission support alterations.  
Budgeting for TEMPALTs shall include sufficient funding to remove the alteration and 
restore the ship to its original configuration.  TEMPALTs are not funded as part of the 
FMP. 
 
9-10.4 TEMPALT Categories 
The following are the general TEMPALT categories: 
• At-sea testing and evaluation, i.e., including sea trials, fast cruise, SONAR 
certification, and weapon or missile system certification trials 
• Research and development 
• Operational Evaluation/Technical Evaluation (OPEVAL/TECHEVAL) 
• Special Mission/Battle Group 
• Military Exercise or Contingency Operations 




TEMPALTs shall be reviewed and technically approved by the cognizant SPM before being 
authorized for accomplishment by the cognizant TYCOM.  Alterations that are intended to be 
installed for a period in excess of one year or one operational deployment shall be considered a 
permanent change to a ship’s configuration and shall be accomplished as a SHIPALT.  After 
completion of testing requirements, mission or exercise support requirements or one year, 
whichever comes first, TEMPALTs must be removed and the ship restored to its previous 
configuration.  The activity sponsoring the accomplishment of the TEMPALT shall be 
responsible for funding the removal of the TEMPALT and the restoration of the ship. 
If the intent/functionality of a TEMPALT is accomplished by a follow-on SHIPALT, that 
TEMPALT will be cancelled and not authorized for further installations.  TEMPALT 
installation drawings that are not developed by the PY shall be forwarded to the PY for 
review and approval. 
TEMPALTs that may affect Battle Group Interoperability will be coordinated with the cognizant 
CINC /NAVSEA 53 prior to installation scheduling. 
9-10.6 TEMPALT Process 
TEMPALT planning, development and execution closely mirrors the process for permanent 
SHIPALTs.  The sponsoring activity will submit a JCF to the cognizant SPM to obtain a 
TEMPALT number and concept approval.  However, the JCF is not used to obtain funding. 
Funding associated with TEMPALTs will be borne by the sponsoring activity not the SPM.   
TEMPALTs do not require the development of a formal document like the SAR, which is 
required for SHIPALTs.   However, alteration design development for TEMPALTs is the same as 
for SHIPALTs.  A Plan of Actions and Milestones (POA&M) will be developed by the 
sponsoring activity which outlines requirements for design shipcheck, design development, 
drawing approval, assembly fabrication, testing (e.g. land-based, pre-and-post installation, at-sea), 
alteration accomplishment and alteration approval.  The POA&M should include all personnel 
associated with the TEMPALT during its entire installed timeframe, as well as the identification 
and mitigation of all topside impacts to the CS.  The SPM, TYCOM and PY are required to 
review the POA&M and provide comments to the sponsoring activity.  The SPM, TYCOM and 
PY will be provided copies of the final POA&M. 
After the POA&M is issued, the sponsoring activity must coordinate detailed planning with the 
TYCOM and SPM to establish which ship is to receive the TEMPALT (if not previously 
identified in the tasking document) and to determine dates that the ship will be available for 
design shipcheck and alteration accomplishment. 
TEMPALT installation drawings, similar to SIDs are also required.  The sponsoring activity is 
responsible for developing detailed installation drawings and for providing them to the SPM with 
adequate time for the applicable PY to review.  Minimal review time is 30 days. 
While the SPM does not “certify” the adequacy of TEMPALT logistics products as it does for 
SHIPALTs, and the FMP ILS Certification Milestones do not apply, any and all ILS products that 
will be provided for the purposes of supporting the operation, testing and maintenance of the 
TEMPALT shall be documented on an ILS Certification Form.  It is recommended that a 
completed ILS Certification Form be provided to the SPM in sufficient time, prior to installation, 
to allow the SPM ample time to review and resolve any potential supportability issues 
surrounding the installation and support of the TEMPALT (preferably 4 months prior to 
installation, but NLT 2 months prior to installation).  Furthermore, TEMPALT Configuration 
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Status Accounting (CSA) requirements shall be documented in the ship’s Current Ship 
Maintenance Project (CSMP) using the Departure From Specification (DFS) process as well as 
through the CDMD-OA process used for SHIPALTS. 
Scheduling for TEMPALTs shall be performed in the same manner as SHIPALTs. 
9-10.6.1 TEMPALT Installation and Removal Messages 
The sponsoring activity will notify the cognizant SPM, CINC, and TYCOM by naval message 
when any TEMPALT installation is accomplished on any active ship and when any TEMPALT 
installation is relocated or removed.  At a minimum, installation messages will contain the 
TEMPALT number and title, ship’s name and hull number, date of installation, any preliminary 
ILS provided, proposed removal date, the sponsoring activity’s point of contact and references to 
the SPM approval and TYCOM’s authorization.  In addition, the installation message will include 
a statement certifying that the installation was accomplished in accordance with the TEMPALT 
installation drawings; and any discrepancies were adjudicated in accordance with reference 
S9(aa), as applicable.  If training is required, the installation message will also include names of 
ship’s personnel trained to operate and maintain the TEMPALT equipment.  Removal messages 
will contain the TEMPALT number and title, ship’s name and hull number, date of removal, and 
a statement certifying that the ship was restored to original configuration or any outstanding 
related item preventing restoration. 
9-10.7 Responsibilities 
9-10.7.1 Sponsoring Activity 
• Identify those TEMPALTs which support a special mission for the duration of a specific 
deployment and which are being considered for class and multi-ship approval. 
• Provide project or program funding and coordination for all phases of TEMPALT 
development, including detailed design packages, installation, and restoration of the ship to 
its original configuration. 
• Identify installation test and evaluation requirements of all TEMPALTs. 
• Develop the TEMPALT JCF and submit to the SPM for approval. 
• Develop TEMPALT installation drawings. 
• For the purpose of adjudicating nonconformance, TEMPALT drawings are considered 
nondeviation drawings.  In cases where the approved TEMPALT design must be modified to 
suit a particular installation, the required nonconformance to TEMPALT design will be 
adjudicated by the IA in accordance with DFS procedures of reference S9(aa) Volume V Part 
I Chapter 8. 
• Develop the TEMPALT POA&M. 
• Ensure that the design documentation for TEMPALTs has been approved by the SPM prior to 
the start of ship-work in accordance with the policy and procedures of this subsection. 
• Ensure that authorization has been obtained from the applicable TYCOM prior to installation. 
• Ensure all TEMPALTs impacting CS equipment are reviewed by the CSE as well as the 
Warfare Area Manager (WAM). 
• Establish a MOA for all work to be performed and accomplish all work in accordance with 
reference S9(aa). 
• Notify the SPM and applicable TYCOM(s) by naval message whenever a TEMPALT has 
been accomplished, relocated, or removed. 
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• Provide a copy of the approved technical data package to the ship each time the alteration is 
accomplished. 
• Provide all ILS products, including Training, required for the operation and maintenance of 
the TEMPALT equipment during its installed time frame or use aboard ship. 
• Provide the CDM CDMD-OA records for TEMPALT equipment after installation. 
 
9-10.7.2 SPM 
• Ensure that TEMPALTs are technically satisfactory (e.g., safe, weight and moment, stability, 
missile hazard, access to and operation of vital equipment, etc.). 
• Obtain PY review and input on TEMPALTs.  Ensure ship impacts (e.g. cabling, foundations, 
new/relocated equipment, power, etc.) are considered in TEMPALT installation drawings. 
 
9-10.7.3 TYCOM 
• Authorize accomplishment of only those TEMPALTs that have been approved for 
accomplishment by the SPM. 
• Adjudicate non-conformance to approved TEMPALT design in accordance with DFS 
procedures or Reference S9(aa) Volume V Part I Chapter 8. 
• Maintain administrative control and monitor installation and removal of TEMPALTs. 
• Notify CNO when authorizing installation of TEMPALTs that may impact ship mission or 
operational capabilities.  
 
9-10.8 Configuration Status Accounting (CSA) 
CSA for TEMPALTs shall be documented in CDMD-OA as it is for SHIPALTs, AERs, and 
equipment alterations, as well as the ship’s CSMP using the DFS process.  Configuration 
development will normally be to the top-level configuration to provide for the general 
identification of the equipment installed by the TEMPALT.  This allows the CDM to identify the 
equipment and establish a CI record in CDMD-OA for purposes of CSA once the installation has 
been validated as complete.  This data will be provided by the sponsoring activity in accordance 
with the requirements of references S9(c) and S9(g) and Section 8 of this manual.  CSA for 
TEMPALTs shall also be accomplished utilizing the DFS process as described in reference 
S9(aa) Volume V Part I Chapter 8.  This process requires that the DFS be entered into the CSMP 
and the installing activity database until such time as the ship’s original configuration is either 
restored or permanent approval of the TEMPALT is authorized. 
Ship’s Force shall provide the sponsoring activity a DFS number.  The subject line of the DFS 
shall read: “DFS Request-New Technology Test Initiative.”  The sponsoring activity shall 
provide the following information in block 14 of the DFS. 
• Description of TEMPALT.  (Include anticipated benefit) 
• Product and Manufacturer 
• Sponsoring Agencies (i.e. Port Engineer, Depot Facility, SPM, SPAWAR, FTSCLANT, 
NSWC, ISEA, Contractors, etc.) 
• Technical and other assists if required (Ship’s Force, SIMA, RRC, etc.) 
• Estimated Date of Installation 
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• Define Test initiative and compartment location (system, equipment, component, hull 
structure, etc) 
• Describe long/short term ILS plans, if available (for parts support, other new maintenance 
requirements, PMS, and technical documentation) 
• Provide estimated test completion date and sponsoring agency evaluation POA&M 
 
Ship’s Force shall forward the DFS to the applicable TYCOM for approval.  The 
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This TEMPALT Data Package provides the necessary information to install OED SCI 
MSL Architecture aboard the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19).  This OED SCI MSL 
Architecture Force Level suite of equipment consists of two SCI servers (HP J6000), one 
SCI OED workgroup switch (OS-4024), one SCI Media Converter (MILAN 9100X), one 
Sun Rave Radiant Mercury, two SCI client workstations (HP J6000), one SCSI 
Expansion Chassis, one Disk Storage System (DS2100), and one JWICS Router in  Rack 
No. 1.  Additionally,  one Coalition server (HP J6000), one Media Converter (MILAN 
9100X), one Stoneghost Metaframe PC Server (V133-1126), one Bison Metaframe PC 
Server (V133-1126),  one JWICS Metaframe PC Server (V133-1126), one Targeting 
client workstation (HP J6000), one Collections client workstation (HP J6000) and six 
CISCO 2621 Routers (Stoneghost, Bison, COWAN A, COWAN C, COWAN J and 
COWAN K) in Rack No.2 will be supplied.  Also required on the SCI Enclave are two 
(2RU) Neptune FPDs, four remote SCI Client Workstations (including FPD, KYBD and 
TBALL) and seven SCI Client Desktop Workstations (including FPD, KYBD and 
TBALL).  A 100Mb port on the SCI edge switch (ESXXXXX) will be necessary to 
provide the required LAN connectivity. 
 
There will be 115VAC/60Hz power requirements for the uninterruptible power sources 
for all equipment.  Also, all drops will require access to a ships power panel, which has a 
current feed sufficient to supply 1.5KVA UPS. 
 

















Project Title:   OED SCI MLS Architecture Installation for the USS Blue Ridge 
 
Security Classification:  SCI 
 
Sponsoring Activity:  PMW-157 
 
Applicable Ship:                   USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) 
 
Applicable TYCOM:             COMNAVSURFPAC 
Overall Port Eng.   Bob Keyes (619.556.0240) 
Port Engineer    Charlie Sutton (011.81.80.311) 
 
Alteration Site:                      Yokosuka, JAPAN 
 
Alteration Activity:               PMW-157 
                                              SPAWARSYSCEN San Diego 
    4301 Pacific Highway 
    San Diego, CA 92110-3127 
  
Alteration Duration:              One year (365 days) 
 
Alteration Technical             





A.  Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) 
B.  Temporary Alteration Impact Data  
C.  Stress Calculations (N/A) 
D.  Calculated Weight and Moments Record 
E.  Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) General Information 
Removal/Exit Plan 






NAVSEA TECHSPEC 9090-310D Alterations to Ships Accomplished by Alteration Installation 
Team. 
SSCSDINST 4720.1 Shipboard Installation Guidance 
SWRMCINST 4790.3 SWRMC Structure, Policies and Procedures 
SPAWAR C4I Temporary Alterations Guidelines, Version 4, DTD October 29, 2002 
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OED SCI MLS Architecture Force Level System Installation 
 
The purpose of this TEMPALT is to improve functionality; refresh technology and provide multi-
level all source intelligence fusion, analysis and dissemination. Provides single common desktop 
solution for accessing multiple security domains. This is accomplished through the introduction 
of Coalition, Stoneghost, Bison, JWICS and SCI Backup servers on the SCI enclave.  
 
OED SCI MLS Architecture Force Level interface requirements include: 
115VAC, 60Hz, single phase power: 
two 20A circuit breaker located in FIC 
additional, potential UPS sources to be identified near workstation locations. 
SCI port availability at 100Mb. 
Use available ports on ESXXXXX located in FIC 
SCI LAN: 
SCI server, qty. 2 (HP J6000) 
Coalition server, qty. 1 (HP J6000) 
Stoneghost PC server, qty. 1 (Vision  V133-1126)  
Bison PC server, qty. 1 (Vision  V133-1126)  
JWICS PC server, qty. 1 (Vision  V133-1126)    
Sun Rave Radiant Mercury, qty. 1 (RM2DIA-AX1105) 
SCSI Expansion Chassis, qty. 1 
Disk Storage System, qty. 1 (DS2100) 
IWO Client Workstation, qty. 1 (HP J6000)  
AIWO Client Workstation, qty. 1 (HP J6000)  
Targeting Client Workstation, qty. 1 (HP J6000)  
Collections Client Workstation, qty. 1 (HP J6000) 
PDA, qty. 2 (1RU) 
Neptune FPD, qty. 2  
Router, qty. 7 (CISCO 2621) 
Media Converter, 8 port, qty. 2 (MILAN 9100X) 
24 Port Workgroup Switch, qty. 1 (OS 4024) 
UPS power source, qty. 9 








This installation will have no impact on ship’s systems or safety.  Pre and post 
installation testing will be accomplished by ship’s force to ensure no tactical system 








1. Perform Ship In-Brief and Ship Survey -     TBD 
2. Submit TCCP to 04R3 for Development of TJCF   05/14/03 
3. Submit Non-Standard Offer Message to FLTCOM / TYCOM DTG 
4. Submitted to eCCB (If Applicable)    N/A 
5.  Approval of TCD Waiver (If Applicable)    DTG 
6. Receive Authorization for Install from FLTCOM / TYCOM -  DTG  
7. Develop Drawing and TEMPALT Data Package -    06/01/03 
8. Submit TEMPALT Data Package to 04R-3D for review - 05/14/03 
9. ILS support Documentation -     06/15/03 
10. Assembly Fabrication  (If Applicable)    05/20/03 
11. Submit TEMPALT to SPM for approval -     05/27/03 
12. Receive Approval from Ship Program Manager (SPM)-  06/02/03 
13. Perform RMMCO Check-in -     06/02/03 
14. Begin Equipment Installation -      06/09/03 
15. Complete Installation  -        06/22/03 
16. Perform RMMCO Checkout -     06/30/03 
17. Perform RMMCO Check-in for Removal -   06/01/04 
18. Begin TEMPALT Removal -      06/08/04 
19. Complete Removal -      06/22/04 

















TEMPORARY ALTERATION IMPACT DATA 
 
1 Shipboard Location: 
 1.1 TEMPALT Equipment –FIC (3-67-0-Q), N2 Office Space (3-57-0-
 Q), Cryptology Office (3-81-1-Q), and SUPPLOT (2-88-1-C) 
 
2 Power Requirements: 115VAC, 60Hz, single phase 
3 Power Source:  Ships Power Distribution Breaker/Fuse Panels (two 20A 
Circuits) 
4 Inputs to Alteration: 
• Ship’s 115 VAC, 60 Hz, single phase power 
• 100Mb connection to SCI LAN 
5 Outputs from Alteration:  100Mb connection from associated Backbone or Edge 
switch. 
6 Impact on Ship’s System: 
 6.1  Weight/Moment: 
 
 Added weight (Net): 1183 lbs (I) 
   VM:    50.44 VCG 
   LM:   7.6 LCG (F) 
   TM:   22.5 TCG (P) 
 
6.2 Ship Dynamics:   No Impact 
6.3 Maneuverability:   No Impact 
6.4 Tanks:    No Impact 
6.5 Habitability:    No Impact 
6.6 EMI/RFI:    No Known Impact  
6.7 Communications Security (TEMPEST):  Cables associated with this 
 TEMPALT will be fabricated in accordance with NSTISSAM TEMPEST 
 2-95 with amendment 2-95A and IA-PUB-5239-31 
6.8 System(s)/Equipment(s)/Capability(ies) Disabled:  
 No Impact 
6.9 Equipment Rip-out:   No Impact 
6.10 Heat Load:    No Impact 
 
7 Impact on Safety: 
 
7.1 Watertight Integrity:   No Impact 
7.2 Subsafe:    Not Applicable 
7.3 Life Support:    No Impact 
7.4 Personnel Safety:   No Impact 






8.1 All new cables will be tested by the installing activity for continuity and 
 insulation resistance. 
8.2 Pre and post installation testing and pre and post removal testing of the 
 shipboard system/equipment will be performed by ship’s force to ensure 
 no system degradation has occurred as a result of installation or removal 











The equipment involved in this installation is not of sufficient weight or size to require 





 ATTACHMENT D 
 
CALCULATED WEIGHT AND MOMENTS RECORD 
 
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS) 
 
 
Spare parts and special test equipment are not required to maintain the equipment.  Parts 
support for all of the POR equipment will be provided by NAVICP and any onboard 
allowances will be determined at a later time.  SPAWAR will provide interim operator 
training at the time of installation.  Maintainer training will not be required as all 
equipment is POR.  All follow-on training is provided using OED SCI MLS Architecture 
computer based training CD.  There is also a help file built within the software.  
Technical support will be available through their website 
https://www.jdms.spawar.navy.mil.  A 1-800-838-1816 number is also available for 
further help.   
 
No COSAL is warranted or has been developed for this TEMPALT. 
 
An OED SCI MLS Architecture Installation TEMPALT Integrated Logistics Support 
Certification Form has been completed for this TEMPALT and can be viewed on the 
PMW 157 website https://mccs.spawar.navy.mil/index.cfm. 
 
For any COSAL and / or ILS questions, comments or requests contact Tim Green of 










At the completion of the ship’s deployment, USS Blue Ridge will coordinate with 
COMNAVSURFPAC N43 and USJFCOM to determine the disposition and removal 
schedule of this TEMPALT. 
 
The current planned dates for equipment removal and de-installation is TBD. 
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APPENDIX F: TABLE OF NAVY REFERENCE MESSAGES 
FLEET GENERATED REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
021132Z JAN 04 COMENTSTRKGRU OED MID-CRUISE REPORT 
PARA 2.  CURRENT EMPLOYMENT.  OED IS USED DAILY BY COMENTSTRKGRU AND 
COMDESRON EIGHTEEN STAFF AND ENTERPRISE INTELLIGENCE AND CRYPTOLOGIC 
PERSONNEL AS AN ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TOOL AND AUTOMATED MESSAGE 
HANDLING SYSTEM.  OED'S ABILITY TO RECEIVE, QUEUE, AND FORWARD RECORD MESSAGE 
TRAFFIC FROM UNCLASSIFIED THROUGH SCI COMPARTMENTS (HCS AND GG PARTICULARLY), 
HAS IMPROVED WATCHSTANDERS'AND LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO REVIEW TRAFFIC IN ONE 
PLACE WITHOUT HAVING TO ACCESS MULTIPLE SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL QUEUES LEADING 
TO TIME SAVINGS AND INCREASED EFFICIENCY.  OED'S MLS FUNCTIONALITIES FOR MESSAGE 
PROCESSING/HANDLING, LONG TERM TRACK DATA ANALYSIS, ACCESS TO SCI INTELINK AND 
PRE-LOADED NATIONAL DATABASES, AND SCI CHAT HAVE PROVEN TO BE BOTH INNOVATIVE 
AND HIGHLY EFFICIENT AS THEY PROVIDE A PREVIOUSLY UNAVAILABLE MEANS ABOARD A 
CV(N) TO WORK WITH BOTH GENSER AND SCI MATERIAL ON ONE WORKSTATION. 
 
PARA 5. ORIG RATES OED AS A QUALIFIED SUCCESS AND ENDORSES ITS CONTINUED 
INTEGRATION INTO ADDITIONAL CVICS. 
   
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
220115Z NOV 03  COMSECONDFLT SUBJ/OSIS EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (OED) 
UPDATE (SERIAL 3): OED /FLEET INTELLIGENCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
PARA 1.  THE OED INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE PROVIDES AN MLS ENVIRONMENT WHOSE 
FOUNDATION OFFERS A REALIZABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR A CROSS DOMAIN  SOLUTION (CDS) 
THAT SPANS THE COLLATERAL AND SCI ENVIRONMENTS. 
 
PARA 3. C2F OED UTILIZATION. OED ENABLES INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION AT THE SCI LEVEL, 
AND AUTOMATIC, RAPID, RELIABLE DISSEMINATION INTO THE COLLATERAL ENVIRONMENT 
OF THE WARFIGHTER. A. C2F/CSFL CURRENTLY USES OED TO SUPPORT DAILY JIC WATCH 
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. C2F/CSFL J2 HAS AN OED SERVER AND FIVE WORKSTATIONS 
(THREE IN JIC SPACES, ONE IN J2 OFFICE, AND ONE IN J2 STAFF SPACES). OED IS CURRENTLY 
ACCREDITED AND HAS FULL NETWORK ACCESS TO JWICS AND SCI MSG TRAFFIC, AND CAN 
TRANSMIT TO COLLATERAL (U.S. AND NATO) RECORD MESSAGE SYSTEMS. C2F/CSFL OED 
CURRENTLY PROCESSES MESSAGES TO THE FLEET SIPRNET ENVIRONMENT VIA A GCCS-M 
SERIAL CONNECTION, ALLOWING AUTOMATIC DISSEMINATION OF OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC. 
LIKEWISE, OED PROCESSES NATO MSG TRAFFIC (SEND/RECEIVE) INTO THE COLLATERAL 
ALLIED INFORMATION MESSAGE SYSTEM (AIFS/AIMS). OED PASSES INFORMATION VIA A LIVE 
MLS FILTER FEED WHICH IS AUTOMATICALLY AND SEEMLESSLY DOWNGRADED TO SECRET 
AND NATO SECRET LEVELS IN NON-SCIF SPACES. OVER 100 HIGH INTEREST MERCHANT 
MESSAGES HAVE BEEN PROCESSED TO THE COLLATERAL WORLD WITHOUT ERROR IN A TRUE 
MLS FASHION. THE BENEFIT IS THAT THREAT SHIP UPDATES ARE AUTOMATICALLY PASSED IN 
A TIMELY MANNER TO OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE SUPPORT SHIPS AND SQUADRONS VIA 
RELIABLE AND ACCURATE MULTIPLE SECURITY LEVEL METHODOLOGY. 
B. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS SUPPORTING JIC WATCH REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE: 
-WATCHSTANDERS SEARCH ARCHIVED MESSAGES FOR THEMATIC ISSUES AND KEYWORDS. 
THESE SEARCHES OCCUR ACROSS MULTIPLE SECURITY LEVELS, SAVING WATCHSTANDER 
TIME AND ALLOWING MORE TIME FOR ANALYSIS. 
-OED ALLOWS WATCHSTANDERS TO TRACK VESSEL MOVEMENT THROUGH TIME, SUPPORTING 
WATCH SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REQUIREMENTS. 
-MESSAGE TRAFFIC IS AUTO FORWARD TO WATCHSTANDER JWICS ACCOUNTS BASED ON OED 
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FLEET GENERATED REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES 
USER-DEFINED PROFILES. 
C. C2F/CSFL NEAR TERM OBJECTIVES. HOW WE WILL BETTER USE THE 
FUNCTIONALITIES ALREADY EXISTING IN OED. 
(1). EXPAND USE OF OED TO IMPROVE HLS/HLD ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. 
-DISSEMINATE EVENT-BY-EVENT HIGH INTEREST MERCHANT SUPPORT TAILORED TO C2F 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE COP. 
-DISSEMINATE DAILY AT/FP SUPPORT MESSAGE TO U.S. AND NATO AUDIENCE TAILORED TO 
C2F/CSFL RESPONSIBILITIES. 
(2). EXPAND OED USE TO SUPPORT J2 USERS AT ANY JWICS SCI WORKSTATION. 
-AUTO-DISTRIBUTE ALL-SECURITY LEVEL MSG TRAFFIC AND SCI E-MAIL 
BASED ON USER DEFINED DISSEMINATION PROFILES. 
(3). EXPAND C2F/CSFL ORGANIC SYSADMIN SKILLS AND CAPABILITIES TO 
LOOSEN LIFE-LINE ON CONTRACTOR SUPPORT. 
-CREATE SCRIPTS TO HANDLE BASIC DAY TO DAY SYSADMIN 
-DEVELOP EXPERTISE RECOGNIZED AS THE FLEET STANDARD THAT ENABLES ACCESS TO 
PRIVILEGES NECESSARY FOR COMPREHENSIVE IN-HOUSE SYSTEM MANAGEMENT. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
151130Z SEP 03  
 
USS BLUE RIDGE SUBJ/JOINT MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEM (JMHS) 
REPLACEMENT 
PARA 3.  AN EXAMPLE OF A MORE POWERFUL MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEM IS THE OSIS 
EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (OED) SYSTEM THAT WAS RECENTLY INSTALLED IN SUPPORT 
OF SCI/GENSER INTELLIGENCE MESSAGE HANDLING. THE COMMAND SHIP STRONGLY DESIRES 
THE FLEXIBILITY, SPEED AND EFFICIENCY NOTED IN THE OED MESSAGE HANDLER 
 
PARA 4. USS BLUE RIDGE STANDS READY TO WORK WITH SPAWAR TO IDENTIFY, TEST AND 
INSTALL THE NEXT GENERATION OF MESSAGE HANDLER 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
180901Z SEP 03 JAC 
MOLESWORTH 
OED PROGRAM SUPPORT 
 
PARA 1.  REQUESTS CONTINUATION OF OED RDT&E, OMN, OPN SUPPORT DUE TO THE 
CRITICALITY OF OED TO THE JAC’S MISSION. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
211846Z AUG 03 COMLANTFLT / 
N2/N3 
OED SUPPORT TO THE FLEET 
 
CLASSIFIED – “PARA 3 (U)….COMLANTFLT REQUIRES CONTINUED CONTACT REPORTING AND 
REQUESTS JFIC CONTINUE TO HOST [OED] AND OPNAV N612, ONI-4 AND PMW-157 CONTINUE TO 
REOURCE THIS CRITICAL SUPPORT TO THE FLEET.” 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
030845Z JUL 03 C7F FLEET BATTLE EXPERIMENT KILO QUICKLOOK 
PARA 6.  INITIATIVE AREA THREE:  JOINT FIRES….A RAPIDLY RECONFIGURABLE AND RELIABLE 
TECHNOLOGY THAT CAN QUICKLY MEET SECURITY APPROVALS MUST BE IN PLACE SO THAT 
COALITION PARTNERS CAN ARRIVE IN AN AOR AND QUICKLY BECOME PARTICIPANTS IN AN 
EXISTING FIRES NETWORK. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
281346ZMAR03 CFFC N6 / N2 FLEET REQUIREMENTS FOR A MULTI LEVEL SECURE 
(MLS) SOLUTION 
PARA 3.  ISSUE:  IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT OF TIME SENSITIVE AND COALITION OPERATIONS, 
A MLS SYSTEM IS INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION EFFICIENCY 
AND INCREASE SPEED OF INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE AMONG ALLIES AND COALITION 
 127 
FLEET GENERATED REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES 
PARTNERS.  DESPITE EFFORTS BY ALCON, TO DATE THERE REMAINS NO SINGLE IDENTIFIED 
SOLUTION THAT PROVIDES THE FLEET AN ACCREDITED MLS NETWORK THAT BRINGS 
TOGETHER THE COMPLEX ARRAY OF GENSER AND SCI STOVEPIPES (COWAN A, CENTRIXS TIER 
1, NIDTS, CLOCE, STONEGHOST, BISON, ETC.) USED BY THE FLEET TODAY. 
 
PARA 4.  REQUIREMENT:  A SINGLE NETWORK EQUIPPED WITH COMMON APPLICATIONS THAT 
HANDLES AND AGGREGATES DATA OF VARIOUS SECURITY LEVELS ACROSS BOTH SCI AND 
COLLATERAL DOMAINS WITHIN AN ACCREDITED MLS ARCHITECTURE / OPERATING SYSTEM. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
281159Z MAR 03 C2F/C3F NUMBERED FLEET TOP TEN INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 
PARA 5.  MULTIPLE LEVEL SECURITY (MLS).  MULTIPLE LEVEL SECURITY SHOULD  
PROVIDE THE FULL RANGE OF COLLABORATION CAPABILITIES ACROSS NUMEROUS 
NETWORKS OF DIFFERENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION LEVELS, TO INCLUDE SEAMLESS 
EXCHANGE OF EMAIL, WEB PRODUCTS, FILE SHARING AND CHAT. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
111450Z MAR 03 COMSECONDFLT SCI NETWORK SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 
PARA 3.  REQUIREMENT. THE NUMBERED FLEET SCI INFRASTRUCTURE IS THE BACKBONE FOR 
INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE WATERFRONT, AND 
DEPLOYED UNITS.  EFFECTIVE SUPPORT TO TACTICAL FORCES FROM THE OPERATIONAL 
LEVEL OF COMMAND IS SEVERELY DEGRADED WITHOUT A ROBUST AND OPERATIONALLY 
RELIABLE SCI INFRASTRUCTURE.  EXPANDING MISSIONS (TO  INCLUDE HLS/HLD FOR C2F AND 
C3F) AND TAILORED MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY SUPPORT  TO TACTICAL UNITS, AS WELL AS 
EXPANDED INTEGRATION WITH JOINT OPS  THROUGH THE FUNCTIONALLY INTENSE JOINT 
FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFMCC) REQUIRE: 
A.  HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE TO INCLUDE REFRESH. 
B.  OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE TRAINING. 
C.  TECHNOLOGY GROWTH APACE OF EVOLVING ANALYTICAL AND MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY 
NEEDS. 
D.  ABILITY TO TRANSITION SEAMLESSLY BETWEEN AFLOAT AND ASHORE OPERATIONS. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
262206Z FEB 03 COMENTBATGRU REQUEST FOR OED INSTALLATION 
SUMMARY:  REQUEST TO C2F FOR SUPPORT OF OED INSTALLATION ONBOARD USS ENTERPRISE 
(CVN 65) 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 







SEA POWER-21 IMPLEMENTATION MESSAGE NR-3; 
OPERATIONAL AGENT REQUIRED WARFIGHTING 
CAPABILITIES LIST (U) 
 
 
“C2F AND C3F IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE OTHER NUMBERED FLEETS, DEVELOPED AN INITIAL 
LIST OF REQUIRED WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES WHICH WAS PRESENTED AT THE FIRST 
MEETING OF THE SEA TRIAL EXECUTIVE STEERING GROUP (STESG) ON 13 FEB 03. “ 
 
“PARA 6.  SEA BASING IMPROVE AND/OR DEVELOP  
A. JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFMCC) CONCEPT  
B. COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT  
C. MULTI-NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL  INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, 
ANALYSIS, AND FUSION SUPPORT TOOLS MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY STANDARDIZED COALITION 
IT CONNECTIVITY” 
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MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
101447ZDEC02 COMSECONDFLT OSIS EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (OED) 
AFLOAT: EVALUATION 
PARA 3. EVALUATION. 
SUMMARY: OVERALL, OED IS A FLEXIBLE, RELIABLE ANALYTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR USE 
AT SEA. OED'S ANALYSIS TOOLS WERE ENABLERS FOR THE FUSION PROCESS IN A SINGLE 
WORKSTATION. DESIGNED FROM THE START TO SUPPORT MULTI-LEVEL-SECURITY 
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, OED'S EXISTING ACCREDITATION PROVIDES A SOLID FOUNDATION 
FOR RAPID MODIFICATION TO ENABLE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COALITION OPERATING 
ENVIRONMENTS. THE OED SYSTEM HAS UNTAPPED POTENTIAL TO BE THE CORE OF 
INTEGRATION EFFORTS FOR NAVY INTELLIGENCE CENTERS AFLOAT. 
 
PARA 5.  A FLOAT VISION FOR OED.  
A. ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE MULTI-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE AFLOAT JIC AS WELL 
AS WITH EXTERNAL PARTNERS.  
B. ABILITY TO RECEIVE AND MANIPULATE IMAGERY.  
C. ABILITY TO OVERLAY AND DISPLAY SIMILAR EVENTS REPORTED BY MULTIPLE 
INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES (E.G., IMAGERY, MASINT, ELINT, COMINT) IN THE SAME GEO-
REFERENCE FRAME.  
D. MLS DATABASE TO HAVE HTML DATA-CONTENTS TAGS AS WELL AS SECURITY LABELS.  
E. ABILITY TO HAVE DIRECT DATA AND VOICE (VOICE OVER IP) INTEROPERABILITY WITH 
OTHER OED SITES (INCLUDING NON-U.S.).  
F. ABILITY TO INTERFACE WITH COALITION INTELLIGENCE DATABASES SUCH AS NATO 
BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION SYSTEM (BICES).  AS 
INFORMATION IS PULLED FROM THESE DATABASES, OED APPLICATIONS WOULD ALLOW THE 
INFORMATION TO BE GRAPHICALLY DISPLAYED AND FUSED INTO A COMMON OPERATING 
PICTURE.  OED WOULD PRESERVE THE ORIGINAL NATO RELEASABILITY OF THIS INFORMATION 
AS IT IS FUSED IN AN ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
132202ZAUG02 COMTHIRDFLT JCSBG INTELLIGENCE LESSONS LEARNED 
PARA 1.B:  “STRONGLY ENDORSE THE CONTINUALLY IDENTIFIED FLEET REQUIREMENT FOR A 
MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY SYSTEM AFLOAT.”  “WRT OED, INFORMAL LIAISON MENTIONED IN 
REF A SHOULD MOVE TO A FORMAL LOOK, IN THEATER AT JICPAC, AND AFLOAT ABOARD 
MOUNT WHITNEY., TO DETERMINE FUNCTIONALITIES THAT CAN BE REALIZED AFLOAT ON 
PACFLT SHIPS TODAY.”  
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
021820ZAUG02 COMCARGRU 7 EQUIPMENT - LACK OF A MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY 
SYSTEM AFLOAT  
IDCLS/L/12373-20899/U// 
ORIG/CCG7/LCDR GREG HUSMANN 
OBSERVATION:  
OEF OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION.  AS THE 
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE ENTITY AFLOAT, THE JCSBATGRU N2 STAFF WAS CHARGED WITH 
COORDINATING THE TIMELY EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN MANY COALITION 
MEMBERS.  SUCH EXCHANGES WERE ACCOMPLISHED VIA A COMPLEX ARRAY OF COMPUTER 
SYSTEMS OPERATING AT SEVEN DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION LEVELS (JWICS, SIPRNET, 
NIPRNET, STONE GHOST, BISON, COWAN, AND LOCE).  WHILE SUCH CONFIGURATIONS ARE 
WORKABLE OVER THE SHORT TERM, THEY PRESENT MANY CHALLENGES THAT IMPEDE THE 
TIMELY FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE WITHIN A COALITION ARCHITECTURE.  THE REQUIREMENT 
EXISTS FOR A SINGLE WORK STATION EQUIPPED WITH COMMON INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS 
ACROSS THE FULL SPECTRUM OF POTENTIAL SECURITY CLASSIFICATION LEVELS. 
 129 
FLEET GENERATED REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES 
   
DISCUSSION:  
A MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY SYSTEM SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF PROCESSING AND EXCHANGING 
DATA AT THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION LEVEL USING THE FOLLOWING APPLICATIONS:   ALL 
MICROSOFT OFFICE APPLICATIONS, MICROSOFT CHAT, WEB BROWSE, AND EMAIL. 
ADDITIONALLY, THE SYSTEM SHOULD ALSO HAVE THE ABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY 
DISSEMINATE MARITIME TRACK DATA TO COALITION PARTNERS AT THE APPROPRIATE 




OVER THE LONG TERM INCORPORATE MULTI- LEVEL SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY INTO GCCS-M.  
FOR THE SHORT TERM, RECOMMEND INSTALLATION/INTEGRATION OF WORK STATIONS WITH 
THE MLS CAPABILITIES INHERENT IN OED IN BOTH CVIC AND SUPPLOT TO MEET 
REQUIREMENTS FOR MLS AFLOAT. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
180235Z DEC 01 COMSECONDFLT SCI GCCS-M LAN UPGRADE REQUIREMENTS 
“TO ACHIEVE NECESSARY FUNCTIONALITY COMMENSURATE WITH INTELLIGENCE AND ISR 
MANAGEMENT AT THE JTF LEVEL, A COMPREHENSIVE SCI GCCS-M LAN UPGRADE IS REQUIRED 
TO PROVIDE AN ACCURATE, TIMELY , FUSED ALL-SOURCE, MULTI-SECURITY LEVEL 
INTELLIGENCE PICTURE TO SUPPORT C2F / COMSTRIKFLTLANT MISSIONS.   THE FOLLOWING 
FUNCTIONALITES ARE REQUIRED: 
A.  AUTOMATED MESSAGE HANDLING / MULTI-SECURITY LEVEL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
(1)  SINGLE, AGGREGATED, MULTI-SECURITY LEVEL DATABASE SUPPORT, ACCESS TO MULTI-
SECURITY LEVEL FILE SHARING OF SCI, US ONLY, NATO AND UNCLASSIFIED RECORD MESSAGE 
TRAFFIC, EMAIL AND MS OFFICE PRODUCTS 
(3)  MULTI-SECURITY LEVEL WEB SERVICES 
B.  ALL-SECURITY-LEVEL LAND/AIR /MARITIME (MERCHANT/SURFACE/ SUBSURFACE) TRACK 
MANAGER WITH HISTORY AND TREND ANALYSIS CAPABILITY. 
E.   A SECURITY LAN INTERFACE BETWEEN U.S. AND NATO/COMMMONWEALTH SYSTEMS, TO 
INCLUDE:  LINKED OPS CENTERS EUROPE (LOCE), COMBINED OPERATIONAL INTEL SYSTEMS 
(COINS), NATO INITIAL DATA TRANSFER SYSTEMS (NIDTS), MARITIME COMMAND CONTROL 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS (MCCIS), JOINT OPERATION INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SYSTEM 
(JOIIS), INITIAL CAOC CAPABILITY (ICC), AND INTELINK-C/STONEGHOST. 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
211442ZMAY 01 CINCLANTFLT 
N6A 
CINCLANTFLT MULTI SECURITY LEVEL-MULTI 
LEVEL SECURITY (MSL-MLS) FOCUS WORKSHOP 
RESULTS 
PARA 2. BASED ON CONFERENCE RESULTS, MSL-MLS SYSTEMS MUST PROVIDE:  
A. REDUCED HULL, MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL (HM&E) SHIPBOARD FOOTPRINT: 
CURRENTLY THERE ARE MULTIPLE AFLOAT NETWORKS. IT IS NOT UNCOMMON TO HAVE A 
SINGLE AFLOAT OPERATOR WHO MUST USE TWO OR THREE COMPUTERS TO ACCOMPLISH 
THEIR MISSION. THE MAIN THREE OPERATIONAL NETWORKS ON LANTFLT VESSELS ARE SIPR, 
NIPR, AND NATO/COALITION. ON MANY PLATFORMS, THE HM&E/HEATING, VENTILATION, AIR 
CONDITIONING (HVAC) EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT TWO OR THREE SEPARATE NETWORKS AND 
ASSOCIATED DESKTOP COMPUTERS HAS OFTEN EXCEEDED THE SHIP'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT 
THEM WITH ADEQUATE POWER AND COOLING.  
B. ABILITY TO SECURELY EXCHANGE DATA BETWEEN USERS/SYSTEMS THAT PROCESS DATA 
ON DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION LEVELS: IN ADDITION, THE PATH MUST BE CAPABLE OF NOT 
HAVING DATA "LEAK" FROM HIGH SIDE TO LOW SIDE.  
C. ABILITY FOR MSL-MLS TO OPERATE IN BANDWIDTH CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENTS: THERE 
ARE TACTICAL UNITS WHO RELY ON DATA PIPES OF 28KB OR LESS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR 
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MISSION. MSL-MLS SOLUTIONS MUST BE DESIGNED TO OPERATE AT THE LOWEST COMMON 
DENOMINATOR. D. ABILITY FOR MSL-MLS TO OPERATE IN DEGRADED ENVIRONMENT:WITH 
INCREASING RELIANCE BY OUR OPERATING FORCES TO CONDUCT THEIR MISSIONS VIA SIPR 
AND NIPR, MSL-MLS SOLUTIONS MUST BE BUILT ROBUST ENOUGH TO "FIGHT HURT". 
 
MSGID FROM SUBJECT 
272118ZFEB01 COMSECONDFLT  FLEET REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTI LEVEL 
NETWORKS  
PARA 4.B. ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND FIELDING OF FULL CONTENT-BASED MLS 
SOLUTIONS. 
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